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The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles 
to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to 
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the 
outcome of no elections.1 
 
You either break the paradigm, or the paradigm will break you.2 
INTRODUCTION 
While the topic of same-sex marriage has generated a lively academic 
debate,3 there is a lack of transnational comparative analysis of arguments 
 
 1.  W.Va. State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 US 624, 638 (1943). 
 2.  A Colombian mother, Ms. Marta Lucia Cuellar, advocating before the Colombian Congress 
on behalf of marriage equality, YOUTUBE (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=kXx7BhNrIO0&feature=player_embedded. 
 3.  See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL 
LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE]; SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON (Andrew Sullivan ed., 2004); JOHN CORVINO & 
MAGGIE GALLAGHER, DEBATING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2012). Outside the United States, European 
scholars have written extensively about the development of same-sex marriage in that region. See, e.g., 
LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenæs eds., 2001); CONTEMPORARY GENDER 
RELATIONS AND CHANGES IN LEGAL CULTURES (Hanne Petersen, Jose María Lorenzo Villaverde & 
Ingrid Lund-Andersen eds., 2013); JENS RYDSTRÖM, ODD COUPLES: A HISTORY OF GAY MARRIAGE IN 
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commonly made by courts when granting same-sex couples access to 
marriage.4  Courts formulating decisions about same-sex marriage have the 
unique opportunity to reevaluate the privileged legal position of marriage 
in light of current constitutional or fundamental rights.5  As the number of 
claims about inclusion or equal recognition of unmarried couples grows, 
challenges to the rationality of marriage as a privileged institution become 
more relevant.  Some courts understand that it is not possible to protect 
traditional notions of marriage without discussing the rationality of 
marriage as the institution that defines the types of families we ought to 
protect.6  Once marriage is reviewed through the lenses of equality and 
 
SCANDINAVIA (2011). And rather recently, there is some literature on same-sex marriage in Latin 
America. See, e.g., SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN LATIN AMERICA: PROMISE AND RESISTANCE (Jason 
Pierceson, Adriana Piatti-Crocker & Shawn Schulenberg eds., 2013). In recent years there has been 
more literature looking internationally to the same-sex marriage debate. See, e.g., MAN YEE KAREN 
LEE, EQUALITY, DIGNITY, AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: A RIGHTS DISAGREEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETIES (2010); KELLY KOLLMAN, THE SAME-SEX UNIONS REVOLUTION IN WESTERN 
DEMOCRACIES: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC POLICY CHANGE (2013); SAME-SEX COUPLES 
BEFORE NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS (Daniele Gallo, Luca 
Paladini & Pietro Pustorino eds., 2014). 
 4.  Several articles analyze decisions individually. See, e.g., Alejandro Madrazo & Estefanía 
Vela, The Mexican Supreme Court’s (Sexual) Revolution?, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 1883–84 (2011); 
Daniel Bonilla, Same-Sex Couples in Colombia: Three Models for Their Legal and Political 
Recognition, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN LATIN AMERICA: PROMISE AND RESISTANCE, supra note 3, at 
111; Mauricio Albarracin Caballero & Juan Camilo Rivera Rugeles, Jurisprudencia Fuera del Closet 
[Case law out of the Closet], in  CICLO ROSA DIEZ AÑOS: LECTURAS SELECTAS DE UN ESPACIO PARA 
LA DIVERSIDAD SEXUAL Y DE GÉNERO (José Fernando Serrano ed., forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/113120891/Malbarracin-Jrivera-Jurisprudencia-Fuera-Del-Closet-Final-
Octubre-2013-3; Adilson José Moreira, We are Family! Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Unions in 
Brazil, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 1003 (2012). 
 5.  See Nancy Levit, Theorizing and Litigating the Rights of Sexual Minorities, 19 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 21, 25 (2010) (“A number of decisions that are not about lesbian and gay rights have 
fundamentally shaped the Court’s conception of families and love.”); Mary Anne Case, What Feminists 
Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1199, 1209–14 (2010) (making a 
similar argument about how the U.S. Supreme Court reshaped marriage through its sex discrimination 
jurisprudence); see also Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 122 (2010). 
 6.  The first decision on same-sex marriage by the Mexican Supreme Court is a good example: 
[W]hat is constitutionally established is the protection of the family—its organization and 
development—leaving to the legislature to guarantee it in a way that specifically leads to its 
promotion and protection by the State but without such constitutional protection referring to 
or be limited to one type of family, such as the nuclear one (father, mother, and children), 
which would even require that the family was formed exclusively through marriage and that 
this may be a requirement for the constitutional protection of the family to “proceed.” 
Therefore, if the Constitution does not exclusively protect the family that comes from or that 
it is constituted through such institution [marriage], since the protection is to the family, then 
within a democratic rule of law in which the respect for plurality is of its essence, what must 
be understood as constitutionally protected is the family as social reality and, therefore, such 
protection must cover all forms and expressions existing in today’s reality, including those 
families formed through marriage, through de facto unions, by a father or mother with his or 
her children (mono-parental family), or any other that may represent a similar link. 
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autonomy rights, it becomes very difficult to justify its privileged treatment 
vis a vis other emotional associations.7  Other courts, however, have limited 
the discussion of same-sex marriage to the right of same-sex couples to 
access this institution, based on the value of marriage itself.8  Such a 
limitation is only possible when one assumes that marriage and family are 
one single institution.9 This conceptualization of marriage moves the 
debate on marriage from a normative area designed to recognize and value 
only the married family, to one based on equality and autonomy in which 
family law protects differently constructed families.  By treating marriage 
and family as two sides of the same coin, countries are trapped in a rigid 
family law structure that leaves too many individuals unprotected. 
This Article reviews decisions that have made marriage available to 
same-sex couples in different countries. In the short term, all of these 
decisions have an impact on the lives of same-sex couples that were denied 
access to marriage as the defining institution of family formation.  In the 
long term, however, some of these decisions will have a more profound 
impact on family protection than others. Decisions from countries that have 
 
Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, 
Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010, slip op. (Mex.), available at http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/ 
ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?AsuntoID=115026. 
 7.  See id. Even before the struggle for the legal recognition of same-sex couples, autonomy and 
equality were used to challenge the distinction between married and unmarried heterosexual couples. 
Individual claims for equal treatment in the area of torts show the tension between privileging marriage 
and recognizing that unmarried couples may be substantially equal to married ones. The conflict 
between protecting marriage and accepting the suffering of an unmarried partner as equally worthy of 
protection as the suffering of a married partner is well reflected in Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255 
(2003). In many countries, heterosexual unmarried couples were granted benefits similar to married 
couples before the granting any benefits to same-sex couples. In the case of Australia, benefits to 
unmarried heterosexual couples started in the 1980s. See HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES, 
ADVISORY REPORT, MARRIAGE EQUALITY AMENDMENT BILL 2012 AND MARRIAGE AMENDMENT BILL 
2012 (Cth) 13 (Austl.), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_ 
of_representatives_committees?url=spla/bill%20marriage/report/index.htm. 
 8.  See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003); In re 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 423 (Cal. 2008). These two cases accept that there is a right to choose 
who to marry. At the same time, both decisions analyze marriage as an institution essential to the well-
functioning of society. 
 9.  In re Marriage Cases seems to view marriage as the exclusive door to family formation: 
Society . . . has an overriding interest in the welfare of children, and the role marriage plays in 
facilitating a stable family setting in which children may be raised by two loving parents 
unquestionably furthers the welfare of children and society . . . . It is these features that the 
California authorities have in mind in describing marriage as the “basic unit” or “building 
block” of society. 
183 P.3d at 423. Many constitutional provisions as well as international conventions refer to marriage 
and family in the same provision and it is not clear if the intent is to treat marriage and family as one 
single concept, as two separate concepts, or as two connected concepts where marriage is viewed as a 
unique door to family formation. For an analysis of marriage and family in constitutional texts and 
conventions see infra Part II.B. 
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sanctioned same-sex marriage reveal deeper understandings of marriage 
and family law than just a simple score in favor of same-sex marriage.  For 
example, there are two clear directions in the Western world.10  On the one 
hand, there is a movement to keep marriage as the paradigm of family law, 
maintaining its value as an institution that makes society better.11  This is 
the direction that some courts, including the Supreme Court of the United 
States, appear to have taken thus far.12  On the other hand, there is also a 
shift away from valuing marriage as the main gateway to family formation, 
and towards emphasizing the value of alternative social family 
constructions.13 This shift is the natural consequence of decisions based on 
equality and autonomy, as seen in decisions from Canada, South Africa, 
Mexico, Brazil, Portugal, Spain, and Colombia. 
Further, the decisions analyzed below demonstrate that the arguments 
brought by parties for and against same-sex marriage are repeated across 
countries, regardless of cultural differences.  They also show comparative 
law at work.  Many decisions outside the United States cite decisions by 
foreign courts on same or similar topics.  Even when foreign decisions are 
not cited, the briefs and amicus briefs presented to the court reference 
decisions by foreign courts.  There is, therefore, an incontestable influence 
of foreign decisions when it comes to same-sex marriage litigation. 
 
 10.  “Western world” can mean different things. In this paper, I use the term, following Harold 
Berman, as a cultural rather than a geographic term. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: 
THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 2 (1983). Both Europe and the Americas, 
however, are also geographically part of the Western legal tradition. At the same time, South Africa has 
embraced a constitutional system influenced by the Western legal tradition. The influence of Roman-
Dutch law in South Africa is well documented. See, e.g., SOUTHERN CROSS: CIVIL LAW AND COMMON 
LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 37–45 (Reinhard Zimmermann & Daniel Visser eds., 2012). South Africa’s 
constitutional law is also influenced by the West, especially by values of equality and dignity post-
apartheid. See HEINZ KLUG, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 45–82 
(2010). 
 11.  See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage is Good for America, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2008 at 
A9 (“[A world without marriage] is a world of fragile families living on the shadowy outskirts of the 
law; a world marked by heightened fear of loneliness or abandonment in crisis or old age; a world in 
some respects not even civilized, because marriage is the foundation of civilization.”). Many same-sex 
advocates embraced early on in the struggle for same-sex marriage the argument that marriage was 
good for same-sex couples because it was good for everyone. See, e.g., Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty 
and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 855–56 (2014) [hereinafter 
Franklin, Marrying Liberty]. 
 12.  See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 425; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948; United 
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692–93 (2013). 
 13.  See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, 
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND 
GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2009); Katherine M. Franke, The Politics 
of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236 (2006); Nancy D. Polikoff, For the 
Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage Both Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y. 
CITY L. REV. 573 (2005). 
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This Article compares arguments made by courts that have protected 
same-sex marriage in order to demonstrate to future litigators and judges 
that expanding the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples can 
either strengthen marriage to the detriment of families formed outside 
marriage, or strengthen family diversity without having to sacrifice same-
sex marriage at all. 
Part I describes the main arguments found in decisions from South 
Africa, Europe, and the Americas granting same-sex marriage. Despite 
cultural differences, advocates and opponents of same-sex marriage have 
used similar arguments in different countries.  This shows how courts have 
reinforced the marriage paradigm by affirming same-sex marriage, while 
others have granted same-sex marriage by reinforcing the rights to equality 
and autonomy.  This second argument ultimately opens the door to equal 
recognition of the legal worth of married and unmarried families. 
Part II explains why it is problematic to use marriage as the paradigm 
of family law and legal protection.  It shows the current disconnect between 
families that exist regardless of their legal recognition, and the married 
family as the aspirational family that legal systems generally embrace and 
support.  This section ends with two illustrations that reveal what happens 
when courts miss the opportunity to look at social families and conform to 
a legal structure based on marriage. It demonstrates that when decisions are 
based on the inherent value of marriage, they may end up ignoring real 
family ties formed between different individuals. 
Part III analyzes the role of judicial borrowing in same-sex marriage 
adjudication. It shows how the most recent decisions on same-sex marriage 
use foreign law and international law—even when it is not binding—to 
support their own local decisions.  In this context, comparative law is used 
in two different ways. First, courts use arguments used in foreign decisions 
that seem compelling and pertinent to the case at hand. Second, courts use 
comparative law to illustrate international trends in a particular area.  This 
tendency reinforces the idea that the arguments presented to courts, and 
ultimately used by courts to support or reject same-sex marriage, may 
eventually transcend national borders. 
Part IV summarizes the two main options for same-sex protection 
advanced so far by supreme or constitutional courts.  On the one hand, 
there is the possibility of maintaining marriage as the most important 
institution for family formation, and on the other hand, courts can advance 
grounds for a new family law based on the rights of equality and autonomy. 
Finally, Part V concludes that more courts are basing their decisions to 
uphold same-sex marriage on equality and autonomy than on marriage as 
an essentially good institution, although some courts still use the rationale 
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of marriage as the family law paradigm.  Part V also concludes that most 
courts use the concept of human dignity to support same-sex marriage, 
although what human dignity means varies from court to court. At the same 
time, this Article shows that many decisions refer to the need for legal 
systems to adapt to social realities, which in turn will provide opportunities 
for unmarried families to be recognized as such.  Finally, this Article 
concludes that comparative law matters to courts reviewing same-sex 
marriage, and that courts look to one another when deciding these 
important issues. 
I. SIMILAR DISCOURSES ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
As of July 2014, same-sex marriage was available in eighteen 
countries.14  The shift from marriage as a union between a man and a 
woman to a union of two individuals regardless of their sex has been the 
result of legal decisions,15 or the consequence of a political process.16  In 
some cases, recognition has been the result of a legislative change later 
confirmed by supreme or constitutional courts.17  In rare cases, recognition 
has been triggered by courts mandating that legislatures seek a solution for 
same-sex couples, or rejecting political processes against same-sex 
marriage.18 
 
 14.  Same-sex marriage is available in Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Iceland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
Uruguay, parts of the United States, and parts of Mexico. On June 18, 2014 Luxembourg’s legislature 
approved same-sex marriage. It will be available in 2015. See Loi du 4 juillet 2014 portant de réforme 
du mariage [Law of July 4, 2014 on the Reform of Marriage], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCHÉ 
DE LUXEMBOURG [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF LUXEMBOURG], July 17, 2014, p. 1798, available  at 
http://www.chd.lu/wps/portal/public/RoleEtendu?action=doDocpaDetails&id=6172A#. 
 15.  Brazil has adopted this approach. See infra note 26. For a complete account of decisions in 
the United States, see FREEDOM TO MARRY, www.freedomtomarry.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2015). The 
Supreme Court of Mexico has also issued three decisions allowing same-sex marriage in the State of 
Oaxaca, and there are several writs of amparo [protection] claiming marriage equality pending 
throughout the country. Since Mexican decisions only affect the direct claimants, these decisions don’t 
have the effect of overruling the Civil Code’s definition of marriage in Oaxaca, or any other Mexican 
State. Same-sex couples wishing to marry must apply for a marriage license and be rejected. After 
being rejected, they are eligible to file a writ of amparo and wait for a favorable decision. See infra note 
28. 
 16.  This was the case in Argentina, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, England and Wales, Luxembourg, the State of 
Quintana Roo in Mexico (through a mandate of its Secretary of State), and the states of New 
Hampshire, Vermont, New York, Maine, Maryland, Washington, Rhode Island, Delaware, Minnesota, 
Hawaii, Illinois, and the District of Columbia in the United States. 
 17.  This occurred in Canada, Federal District of Mexico, Spain, Portugal, and France. 
 18.  See, e.g., Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.). Colombia’s Constitutional Court followed 
South Africa’s model but its Congress failed to follow the Constitutional Court’s decision when it 
rejected a same-sex marriage bill on April 24, 2013. See Isabel Colomna, Plenaria de Senado no 
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By the end of 2014, there were more than thirty decisions reasoning 
that same-sex marriage is either constitutionally mandated or allowed. This 
Article analyzes eight decisions from state supreme courts or circuit courts 
in the United States that have resulted in legal marriage for same-sex 
couples,19 and United States v. Windsor, the United States Supreme Court 
decision that declared Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) 
unconstitutional.20 This Article also analyzes a majority of available 
decisions from the highest courts in countries outside the United States that 
provided substantive rulings in favor of same-sex marriage.21 In 
chronological order these are: Canada,22 South Africa,23 Portugal,24 Mexico 
(for the Federal District of Mexico),25 Brazil,26 Colombia,27 Mexico (for the 
State of Oaxaca),28 and Spain.29 
 
respaldo matrimonio Igualitario (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.senado.gov.co/sala-de-prensa/noticias/ 
item/16987-plenaria-no-aprobo-matrimonio-igualitario. In Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006), 
the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that same-sex couples were entitled to the same rights and 
benefits as heterosexual couples. Like the Colombian Constitutional Court, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court gave the legislature the option of amending the marriage statutes or enact a parallel system. See 
id. The New Jersey legislature chose the latter and established a civil union system. In 2013 the New 
Jersey Supreme Court declared that dual system unconstitutional. See Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 
A.3d 336, 368–69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 2013). California is a combination of change triggered by 
legal decisions and decisions rejecting political processes against same-sex marriage. See; Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 
1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 19.  See Garden State, 82 A.3d 336; Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 941 
(Mass. 2003); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013); Lee v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719, 
2014 WL 683680 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014); 
Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014). 
 20.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013). 
 21.  I excluded from this analysis the decision by the Constitutional Council of France issued in 
2013, since it mostly discusses whether the Constitution would allow the legislature to amend the 
concept of marriage. See generally Conseil Constitutionneil [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 
2013-669, May 17, 2013 (Fr.). 
 22.  Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (Can.). 
 23.  Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 24.  S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367 
(Port.). 
 25.  Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de 
inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010,  slip op. (Mex.), available at 
http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?AsuntoID=115026. 
 26.  S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR 
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 611 (Braz.); see also Resolução No. 175, 14 de Maio de 
2013, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (Braz.) (basing its decision on the ruling by the Supreme 
Federal Tribunal and prohibiting public officers from rejecting same-sex marriages). 
 27.  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 26, 2011, Sentencia C-577/11, 
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. 30) (Colom.). 
 28.  Primera Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo 
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Decisions on same-sex marriage tend to utilize similar arguments 
regardless of cultural and legal differences.  This Part focuses specifically 
on three sets of recurring arguments.  The first set is composed of pro-
marriage arguments centered on the idea that marriage makes society 
better.  These arguments do not challenge the premise that family law 
should be anchored primarily in the institution of marriage.  Rather, they 
adopt a “conformist” position that accepts the status quo.  The second set of 
arguments centers on the role of equality and autonomy in making marriage 
available to couples of the same sex.  The third recurring argument in these 
decisions uses dignity as a type of basic constitutional value or right upon 
which to base the grant of same-sex marriage.  Dignity in the context of 
same-sex marriage decisions has been used to emphasize different 
constitutional rights or values.  For example, South Africa and Mexico use 
dignity differently from Mexico and Brazil, who in turn differ from the 
United States Supreme Court’s use of the concept.  The combination of 
equality and autonomy arguments with the concept of dignity provides a 
new framework for family law that has the potential to transform it by 
abandoning the marriage paradigm. 
A. Reinforcing the marriage paradigm 
The first set of recurring arguments assumes that marriage is 
essentially good for society and individuals.30  The argument advances a 
pro-marriage perspective that disagrees over who should enter marriage, 
but nevertheless supports marriage as the paradigm of family formation.  
Among pro-marriage advocates, some consider heterosexuality central to 
the view of marriage as an essentially “good” institution, especially as a 
 
en Revisión 581/2012, Décima Época, 5 de Diciembre de 2012 (Mex.), available at http://www2.scjn. 
gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?AsuntoID=143969; see also Primera Sala de la 
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo en Revisión 152/2013, 
Décima Época, 23 de Abril de 2014, slip op. (Mex.) (favoring 39 plaintiffs from the State of Oaxaca 
and declaring the Civil Code unconstitutional for discriminating against gay and lesbian individuals 
who were afforded protection as a suspect category). This decision, like previous decisions on writ of 
amparo, only benefitted the plaintiffs in this particular case. 
 29.  S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012, (B.O.E., No. 286, p. 168) (Spain). 
 30.  See Franklin, Marrying Liberty, supra note 11, at 855–56 (providing a brief account of these 
arguments by advocates of same-sex marriage); but see Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] 
[Supreme Court], Acción de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010, slip 
op. ¶ 25–183, available at http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx? 
AsuntoID=115026 (outlining the arguments provided by Mexico’s Attorney General challenging same-
sex marriage in Mexico City); see also SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON, supra note 3 
(summarizing arguments pro and against same-sex marriage by scholars, civil society and religious 
actors). 
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precondition to procreation.31  Others promote same-sex marriage precisely 
because marriage as an institution makes society better.32  For both sides, 
however, marriage remains at the center of family law as an institution that 
societies should embrace. Although there are some variations, these 
arguments either assume or eventually conclude that marriage is a good 
thing for society and for the individuals who enter into a marriage.  At its 
core, this argument represents the idealist view of marriage and its 
purposes. 
The United States has an extensive history of protecting marriage 
based on an argument advancing marriage for marriage’s sake. Three 
decisions from different periods demonstrate that U.S. courts have treated 
marriage as vital to the structure of American society.33  As early as 1888, 
the Supreme Court in Maynard v. Hill stated that marriage “is an 
institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply 
interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without 
which there would be neither civilization nor progress.”34 
By the mid twentieth century, the Court maintained its narrative of 
marriage as essential to American society and the survival of humankind. 
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court declared that “[m]arriage and 
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race.”35  Finally, in 1978, the Court affirmed marriage as a constitutional 
right in Zablocki v. Redhail.  In Zablocki, the Court referred to marriage as 
a foundational institution: “it would make little sense to recognize a right of 
privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to 
the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in 
 
 31.  See, e.g., SCJN, Acción de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, ¶ 93–95; Conseil Constitutionnel, 
No. 2013-669, ¶ 17; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d at 882; Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 
2d 941, 951 (Mass. 2003); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 871 (N.M. 2013). 
 32.  American Foundation for Equal Rights (AFER) was the sponsor of the constitutional 
challenge to Proposition 8 in California that amended California’s Constitution to define marriage as a 
union between a man and a woman. On their website, AFER states that “[n]o one should be denied the 
freedom to marry the person he or she loves. Using the latest polling and medical research, AFER has 
put together the best materials that make the case for why marriage equality is important and a 
fundamental right that benefits society.” AM. FOUND. FOR EQUAL RIGHTS, Resources, http://www.afer. 
org/our-work/resources/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2015) (emphasis added). Among scholars supporting 
same-sex marriage for the quality of marriage, see ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, 
supra note 3, at 8. Eskridge, however, does not advocate for a monolithic system where marriage should 
be the exclusive gateway to family formation. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law 
Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 
1881, 1890 (2012). 
 33.  See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
 34.  Maynard, 125 U.S. at 211. 
 35.  Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. 
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our society.”36 
1. Conforming to the status quo. 
Same-sex marriage advocates have employed the argument that 
marriage is essentially good in order to justify expanded access to 
marriage.  The first paragraph of the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s 
decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health leaves no doubt 
about the value that the Massachusetts Supreme Court ascribed to 
marriage.37  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Margaret Marshall 
began the decision by stating “[m]arriage is a vital social institution.  The 
exclusive commitment of two individuals to each other nurtures love and 
mutual support; it brings stability to our society.”38  The decision was a 
full-throated defense of marriage that ultimately extended the right to 
marry to same-sex couples.39  Several paragraphs were devoted to 
explaining the benefits of marriage.40 
Given that marriage in the U.S. is an undisputed constitutional right, 
the court could not have advocated for same-sex marriage while criticizing 
an institution placed by the Supreme Court at the top of the family law 
structure. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, however, had a choice of 
narrative: one based on equal access to an institution that provides tangible 
legal benefits to couples, or one based on an idea of marriage as essentially 
good.  The court acknowledged the former when it stated that “[s]imply 
put, the government creates civil marriage. In Massachusetts, civil marriage 
is, and since pre-Colonial days has been, precisely what its name implies: a 
wholly secular institution.”41 
This was the cue that would have allowed the court to move away 
from the marriage paradigm and argue that similarly situated people should 
have access to the same secular legal creation and the benefits to which 
married couples are entitled. The focus, then, would have been on 
discussing whether same-sex couples were indeed similarly situated to 
heterosexual couples with access to marriage.  The court could have further 
elaborated on the state-created benefits of marriage42 
The equal access line of reasoning would have allowed the Court to 
reach the same holding, while leaving the following chapters of the 
 
 36.  Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386. 
 37.  See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 968–69. 
 40.  Id. at 955–57. 
 41.  Id at 954. 
 42.  See id. at 955–57. 
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Dworkinian chain novel the option to expand on protections for families 
formed outside marriage. Instead, the court focused on the need for 
marriage in society: 
Civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable 
relationships over transient ones. It is central to the way the 
Commonwealth identifies individuals, provides for the orderly 
distribution of property, ensures that children and adults are cared 
for and supported whenever possible from private rather than public 
funds, and tracks important epidemiological and demographic 
data . . . . Because it fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven, and 
connection that express our common humanity, civil marriage is an 
esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry 
is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.43 
Only after explaining how important marriage was for society, did the 
court move to the reasoning for equality.44  The decision stated that the 
Massachusetts Constitution “affirms the dignity and equality of all 
individuals.  It forbids the creation of second-class citizens.”45 Although the 
need to affirm the dignity and equality of all individuals may be obvious, it 
is less clear whether marriage perfects society, or whether it only benefits 
individuals by providing state-granted benefits. 
It is easy to analyze decisions after they are issued and claim that the 
litigants could have chosen a different strategy.  Goodridge was one of the 
first successful cases on same-sex marriage in the U.S. and as such, the 
landscape was completely different when compared with the litigation 
environment in the last few years.46  The litigants chose the strategy that 
likely had the best possibility of success, given the legal environment in 
that particular moment in time.47  For the litigants, marriage was desirable 
for both idealistic and pragmatic reasons.48 
 
 43.  Id. at 954–55. 
 44.  See id. at 958–68. 
 45.  The decision has two paragraphs about the tangible benefits of marriage and it affirms that 
“[t]he benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect 
of life and death. The department states that ‘hundreds of statutes’ are related to marriage and to marital 
benefits.” Id. at 955–56. 
 46.  For an account of the background and history of the Goodridge litigation, see Mary L. 
Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 69 (2005). 
 47.  Mary Bonauto explains how Massachusetts had moved towards an environment more 
favorable to LGBT rights and the need to litigate same-sex marriage before detractors of same-sex 
marriage started to push for a constitutional amendment to restrict marriage to one man and one woman.  
Id. at 27. 
 48.  Mary Bonauto tells us that Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) encountered 
many same-sex couples who “wished to make [their] commitments legally binding and to share in the 
community of those who have made marriage vows. This should not be surprising, because LGBT 
people are part of the larger culture in which marriage represents the ideal institution of connection and 
commitment.” Id. at 4. At the same time, she recognized that “the fifty dollars a couple spends on a 
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The Supreme Court of California also used a narrative that reinforced 
a differentiated status between married and unmarried couples.49  Citing a 
prior decision, the court in In re Marriages Cases linked marriage and the 
family as if they were one unique institution: 
The family is the basic unit of our society, the center of the personal 
affections that ennoble and enrich human life. It channels biological 
drives that might otherwise become socially destructive; it ensures 
the care and education of children in a stable environment; it 
establishes continuity from one generation to another; it nurtures 
and develops the individual initiative that distinguishes a free 
people. Since the family is the core of our society, the law seeks to 
foster and preserve marriage.50 
The narrative of marriage as an institution that makes society better is 
also found in more recent decisions on same-sex marriage.  In Geiger v. 
Kitzhaber, the court’s description of the parties starts by stating, “[a]ll of 
the plaintiffs share in the characteristics that we would normally look to 
when we describe the ideals of marriage and family.”51  Later, the court 
turns to an argument provided by the State in the plaintiff’s favor: 
Simply put, marriage matters. It matters not only for the individuals 
who decide to enter into the civil union, but also for the state. This 
is why the state links so many rights and protections to the decision 
to marry. Strong, stable marriages create unions in which children 
may be raised to become healthy and productive citizens, in which 
family members care for those who are sick or in need and would 
otherwise have to rely on government assistance, and through which 
community is built and strengthened.52 
The conformist approach to marriage makes little sense in light of the 
oft-cited quote from Planned Parenthood v. Casey, also cited in Lawrence 
v. Texas and Goodridge, on the role of the judiciary: “[o]ur obligation is to 
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”53  How is the 
protection of marriage over all other emotional associations not a mandate 
of a particular moral code? 
 
marriage license will buy them more protection than any set of lawyers’ documents ever will.” Id. at 6. 
 49.  See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 423 (Cal. 2008); see also Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 
704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 50.   In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 422. The same decision cites Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 
582 (Cal. 1998), in which the California Supreme Court, citing prior decisions, stated that “[t]he joining 
of the man and woman in marriage is at once the most socially productive and individually fulfilling 
relationship that one can enjoy in the course of a lifetime.” In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 422. 
 51.  Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133 (D. Or. 2014) (citations omitted). 
 52.  Id. at 1137. 
 53.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992); see also Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 948 (Mass. 
2003). 
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Nevertheless, Goodridge triggered a positive outcome by allowing 
hundreds of people to access benefits that were restricted to married 
individuals.54  However, Goodridge did not make same-sex marriage an 
issue about the protection of families.  Instead, Goodridge reinforced the 
primacy of families formed by marriage, leaving out any mention of 
families formed outside of marriage. Moreover, the court employed a 
narrative of assimilation between same-sex couples and heterosexual 
couples.  The decision ensures that readers see the plaintiffs as “equal” to 
the typical heterosexual middle class American family when it states that 
“[t]he plaintiffs include business executives, lawyers, an investment 
banker, educators, therapists, and a computer engineer.  Many are active in 
church, community, and school groups.”55 
Some of the most recent state decisions on same-sex marriage follow 
the same strategy of describing the plaintiffs as people who the reader may 
see as one of their own.56  As Kenji Yoshino states, “gays ‘acting straight’ 
are more likely to win straight acceptance.”57  Showing that same-sex 
couples that want to get married look just like any other heterosexual 
couple is a double-edged sword that the LGBT rights movement is 
constantly struggling with.  On the one hand, the movement wants to show 
that there is nothing different about same-sex couples that would prevent 
them from functioning in society.  On the other, it is difficult to determine 
how much of this depiction corresponds with a description of individuals as 
they truly are, or how much it is an act of surrender to the dominant 
heterosexual culture.  Equalizing depictions are more easily accepted by the 
mainstream, helping to gain more support for a particular cause.58  
Assimilation into the mainstream, however, can also end up destroying the 
 
 54.  According to the Pew Research Center, between 2004 and 2012 there have been 22,406 
marriages by same-sex couples in Massachusetts. Drew Desilver, How many same-sex marriages in the 
U.S.? At least 71,165, probably more, FactTank, News in the Numbers, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 
26, 2013), available at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/26/how-many-same-sex-
marriages-in-the-u-s-at-least-71165-probably-more/. 
 55.  See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948. 
 56. See, e.g., Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 873–75 (N.M. 2013); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. 
Supp. 2d 410, 416–18 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Geiger, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 1133. 
 57.  KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 80 (2006). 
 58.  “‘When you’ve got an appealing litigant, it makes you want to side with them,’ Michael 
Klarman, a professor at Harvard Law School and a former clerk for Ruth Bader Ginsburg, said. ‘Of 
course, you are deciding a case for a much broader group of litigants, so it ought to be irrelevant, but 
it’s not. With school desegregation, the N.A.A.C.P. accepted only plaintiffs who were middle class, 
from the best families, well educated, well dressed. When the American Jewish Congress was thinking 
about school-prayer challenges, they much preferred a Jew to an atheist.’” Ariel Levy, The Perfect Wife, 
THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 2013) http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-perfect-wife. 
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acceptance of diversity that LGBT individuals have longed for.59 
2. Using the concept of human dignity to expand the protection of 
the state to other emotional associations. 
The concept of human dignity has been used in other countries to 
overturn discriminatory statutes and practices.60  The use of human dignity 
reinforces the principles of equality and autonomy that lend themselves to 
the protection of diverse families, and not exclusively married families.  In 
the United States, human dignity is not a novel concept.  Although there is 
no explicit “dignity clause” in the U.S. Constitution, U.S. courts, like courts 
in other countries, have based or at least supported constitutional decisions 
on the premise of human dignity.61  As Jeremey Waldron points out, “there 
does not seem to be any canonical definition of ‘dignity’ in the law.”62 Its 
use, therefore, has varied throughout history and was only consistently used 
as a universal value beginning in the second half of the twentieth century.63  
Furthermore, dignity and human dignity are two different concepts that can 
easily be associated with different historical phases. We learn from Erin 
Daly that dignity was often used by the Supreme Court in the first half of 
the twentieth century as a feature of certain institutions that enjoyed special 
respect, such as courts, the Constitution, or the courthouse.64  The second 
half of the twentieth century, however, marked the Court’s shift from 
institutional dignity to human dignity.65 
 
 59.  See generally Franke, supra note 13, at 239 (critiquing the problem of marriage and 
assimilation, writing, “The creation of new gay publics outside City Hall, on the pages of the New York 
Times, and on the six o’clock news are not exactly the gay publics the drag queens at Stonewall had in 
mind.”). 
 60.  Paolo Carozza, Human Dignity in Constitutional Adjudication in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 459–66 (Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011). 
 61.  See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under 
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1737 (2008) (noting the invocation of dignity in opinions 
interpreting individual rights guarantees in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Vicki C. Jackson, 
Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 
MONT. L. REV. 15, 16 (2004) (explaining that though the Constitution does not refer to dignity 
explicitly “there are some cognate concepts in the Constitution’s text, such as the ban on cruel and 
unusual punishments, the protections of the due process clause, and others that have been developed in 
the U. S. Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.”). 
 62.  JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANKS, AND RIGHTS 15 (2012). 
 63.  The first mention of dignity by the U.S. Supreme Court in an individual rights case was in 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, but its use did not flourish in the Court’s case law until after the 1940s. ERIN 
DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON 82, 87 
(2012). 
 64.  Id. at 71–79. 
 65.  Although American courts pay less attention to international trends and developments than 
their foreign colleagues, it seems that the narrative of human dignity in the U.S. was influenced, just as 
other countries were, by the new international world order after Second World War. Id. at 82. 
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In the last few decades, the United States Supreme Court and state 
courts have employed the concept of human dignity to inform their 
decisions on an array of issues.66  For example, Justice Kennedy has used 
the concept of human dignity to enhance his decisions on the issues of 
abortion and same-sex couples.67 In Goodridge, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court also used human dignity as a core element to support same-
sex marriage.68  Unfortunately, that court’s development of the concept was 
blurred by its concurrent defense of marriage as an essentially good 
institution.69 
Human dignity is a complex concept that can have different 
meanings.70  The possibility for different interpretations becomes clear 
when one compares the use of dignity by the South African Constitutional 
Court to Justice Kennedy’s use of dignity in Lawrence71 and Windsor.72  
South Africa’s idea of dignity is closely related to a concept of equality 
before the law.73  In contrast, Justice Kennedy used a concept of human 
dignity related to liberty and autonomy in Lawrence, and shifted to an 
institutional concept of dignity enjoyed by the married couple in Windsor.74  
This seems to be a return to the early twentieth-century approach 
 
 66.  See Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. 
L. 201, 202 (2008) (explaining that since the 1940s the Supreme Court has increasingly employed 
dignity to broaden, explain and develop Constitutional protections); Erin Daly, Human Dignity in the 
Roberts Court: A Story of Inchoate Institutions, Autonomous Individuals, and the Reluctant Recognition 
of A Right, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381, 381 (2011). 
 67.  Siegel, supra note 61, at 1737 (discussing abortion). 
 68.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 948, 965 (Mass. 2003).  It may not be a 
coincidence that Justice Marshall is from South Africa where dignity is a core constitutional concept. 
 69.  Id. at 957. 
 70.  Daly, supra note 66, at 61; see generally Stu Woolman, The Architecture of Dignity, in THE 
DIGNITY JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA: CASES AND MATERIALS 
76 (Drucilla Cornell et. al. eds., 2013) (identifying five meanings of dignity in South African 
constitutional case law). 
 71.  See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 72.  See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 73.  See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 49–50, ¶ 78 (S. Afr.) 
(“[W]hat the applicants in this matter seek is not the right to be left alone, but the right to be 
acknowledged as equals and to be embraced with dignity by the law.”). 
 74.  The first paragraph of Lawrence clearly states that the constitutionality of the sodomy statutes 
is a matter of liberty: “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, 
expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its 
spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. Later, the decision states 
that “[i]t suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the 
confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When 
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one 
element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows 
homosexual persons the right to make this choice.” Id. at 567. 
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characterizing dignity as status or as respect owed to an institution.  The 
Ninth Circuit employed a similar approach in Perry v. Brown, indicating 
that the state conferred dignity to the “highest form of a committed 
relationship [marriage] and to the individuals who have entered into it.”75 
Dignity has been conceptualized differently in other areas of the law. 
In the abortion context, Reva Siegel has identified three different meanings 
of dignity: “dignity of life, dignity of liberty, and dignity as equality.”76  In 
Lawrence, Justice Kennedy also referred to dignity mainly as a 
consequence of liberty.77  People who choose their partner and engage in 
sexual conduct “in the confines of their homes and their own private 
lives . . . still retain their dignity as free persons.”78  Dignity in this context 
refers to the right of individuals to be fully autonomous in choosing their 
partners without diminishing their status as human beings worthy of 
recognition.  The decision states that “[t]he liberty protected by the 
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”79 
In Windsor, Justice Kennedy was once again presented with the 
opportunity to advance an American constitutional concept of dignity.  
Adhering to Lawrence, he employed the concept of dignity as linked to 
liberty as a basis for overthrowing the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).  
The decision, however, added the concept of dignity as derived from 
marriage. In other words, people retain their dignity by having the 
possibility of entering into a marriage.  It seems that dignity comes not so 
much from the ability to choose to marry (or to choose not to marry), but 
from the status of being married: 
It seems fair to conclude that, until recent years, many citizens had 
not even considered the possibility that two persons of the same sex 
might aspire to occupy the same status and dignity as that of a man 
and woman in lawful marriage. For marriage between a man and a 
woman no doubt had been thought of by most people as essential to 
the very definition of that term and to its role and function 
throughout the history of civilization.80 
The idea of dignity derived from marriage is reinforced again when 
Justice Kennedy writes: 
By its recognition of the validity of same-sex marriages performed 
in other jurisdictions and then by authorizing same-sex unions and 
same-sex marriages, New York sought to give further protection 
 
 75.  Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1079 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 76.  Siegel, supra note 61, at 1737. 
 77.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
 78.  Id. at 567. 
 79.  Id. This is also the Mexican approach as discussed below. See infra I.B.2. 
 80.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013). 
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and dignity to that bond. For same-sex couples who wished to be 
married, the State acted to give their lawful conduct a lawful status. 
This status is a far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the intimate 
relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by the State 
worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages. 
It reflects both the community’s considered perspective on the 
historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolving 
understanding of the meaning of equality.81 
Although Windsor is not a decision on the constitutionality of same-
sex marriage, it changed the landscape of same-sex marriage litigation.82  
According to the organization Freedom to Marry, by October 2014, less 
than two years after Windsor, there were more than eighty cases 
challenging traditional marriage statutes, with more than forty decisions 
favoring same-sex marriage, and only two decisions rejecting same-sex 
marriage.83 Of the twenty-four final decisions, two followed the 
institutional dignity narrative of Windsor.84  Although both Geiger and 
Whitewood v. Wolf also reference the tangible rights and benefits that come 
with marriage, they use a strong institutional dignity narrative based on 
Windsor.85  They speak of humiliation, degradation, and stigma,86 and 
borrow from Windsor’s narrative on dignity to explain the humiliation 
faced by the children of the plaintiffs.87 
It is clear that U.S. courts are using dignity to justify decisions in 
 
 81.  Id. at 2692–93. 
 82.  A year after Windsor, more than 70 cases from all states/territories without same-sex marriage 
had been litigated or were pending in U.S. courts. For an accurate up to date account, see FREEDOM TO 
MARRY, www.freedomtomarry.org (last visited Feb. 5, 2015). 
 83.  See id. The two decisions against same-sex marriage are Borman v. Pyles-Borman, No. 
2014CV36, 2014 WL 4251133 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2014), and Robicheaux et. al v. Caldwell, 2 F. 
Supp. 3d 910 (E.D. La. 2014). In Borman the plaintiff challenged Tennessee’s Anti-Recognition Law 
that declares void and unenforceable in Tennessee out of state valid marriages if prohibited by 
Tennessee. The decision states that Windsor did not “give an opinion concerning whether a State must 
accept as valid a same-sex marriage allowed in another State.” Borman, 2014 WL 4251133, at *3. The 
opinion found that “the laws and the Constitution of Tennessee do not deny equal protection because 
they do not burden a fundamental right, target a suspect class or intentionally treat one differently that 
others similarly situated without any rational basis or difference.” Id. In Robicheaux a U.S. District 
Court decided that “[t]he State of Louisiana has a legitimate interest under a rational basis standard of 
review for addressing the meaning of marriage through the democratic process,” dismissing the 
challenge to Louisiana’s ban on same-sex marriage and lack of recognition of out-of-state same-sex 
marriages. Robicheaux, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 913. 
 84.  See Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. 
Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 2014). 
 85.  Geiger, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 1128. 
 86.  Id. at 1136, 1139; Whitewood, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 421. 
 87. Geiger, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 1144; Whitewood, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 417 (“In the words of Deb 
Whitewood, ‘[the lack of same-sex marriage] sends the message to our children that their family is less 
deserving of respect and support than other families. That’s a hurtful message.’”). 
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different areas.  It is not clear, however, that all courts are using dignity as 
a univocal concept.  In the case of gay and lesbian rights, we see a concept 
of human dignity attached to freedom of choice, and a concept of 
institutional dignity attached to marriage. Which one will prevail depends 
on how this concept continues developing in the future.  
The second use of dignity harkens back to institutional dignity as 
applied by the Court in the first half of the twentieth century. This is not a 
universal concept of dignity.  Rather, it is selective because it does not 
apply to all institutions.  According to the Court, only some institutions 
possess dignity, and marriage is one of them.  The use of dignity in 
Windsor as derived from marriage curtails freedom.  As the rationale goes, 
some choices are better than others, even if the alternatives do not violate 
equality, due process, or any other constitutional right. Under this theory, 
marriage provides couples with a kind of dignity that unmarried couples 
cannot access. 
B. Dignity, equality, and autonomy: the transformation of family law 
through same-sex marriage 
The second set of arguments in litigation dealing with same-sex 
marriage is based on a claim for equality and autonomy.  This argument 
supports extending marriage to same-sex couples because it is the right 
thing to do, and not because marriage is essentially good, but because 
similarly situated groups of people should be treated equally.  Arbitrarily 
depriving one group of people a right that another group enjoys cannot 
have a reasonable aim.  Same-sex marriage advocates within this debate 
agree that marriage should be expanded, but not all of them assert as a 
primary reason that marriage is essential to society.88  At the forefront of 
equalization between married and unmarried individuals, it is thus possible 
to find same-sex marriage advocates for pragmatic reasons and advocates 
of equal treatment between married and unmarried people. These 
arguments do not require courts to take a position on the importance of 
marriage as an institution.  These arguments reinforce individual rights, 
such as equality and autonomy, as core elements of society.  Whether it is 
marriage, contraceptives, jobs, or healthcare, a benefit granted to 
heterosexuals should be granted to everyone else that is similarly situated. 
Within this context, the focus of the same-sex marriage debate shifts 
from the legal meaning of marriage to the meaning of equality, autonomy, 
or both.  The decisions analyzed below share a similar rationale.  Each one 
allows constitutional principles to take on an evolving role to accommodate 
 
 88.  See Polikoff, supra note 13, at 593. 
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new situations.  All of these decisions tackle different arguments presented 
to the court by the parties to the litigation.  However, they all refer to 
concepts of equality and autonomy as the grounds for providing rights to 
same-sex couples, and moving towards the recognition of same-sex 
marriage.  This is the case in Canada, South Africa, Mexico, Spain, 
Portugal, Brazil, Colombia, and, with some limitations, the U.S. state of 
Iowa. 
Additionally, most of these decisions refer to dignity as a foundation 
for granting same-sex marriage.89  Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Windsor, other courts have linked dignity to equality and autonomy.90  
South Africa mostly refers to dignity as a quality that provides all 
individuals with equality of worth.91  Mexico, Brazil, Spain, and Colombia 
refer to dignity as linked to the right to autonomy, especially in the context 
of making decisions on family formation.92 Finally, all of these decisions 
refer to constitutional principles that adapt to new realities, or refer to a 
constitutional protection of the family in which what constitutes a family 
depends on the social construction of that concept.93 
 
 89.  The exception to this trend is Canada. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage does not mention 
dignity as a part of its reasoning. See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (Can.). The 
Supreme Court of Canada has struggled with the use of human dignity as a constitutional value.  
Although it was a common ground in decisions until the 1990s, the “Law test” established in the case 
Law v. Canada required the party arguing discrimination to show injury to dignity. See Law v. Canada, 
[1999] S.C.R. 497 (Can). In 2008, the Canadian Supreme Court confirmed that “the protection of all of 
the rights guaranteed by the Charter has as its lodestar the promotion of human dignity.” R. v. Kapp, 
[2008] S.C.R. 483, 504 (Can.). It did, however, criticize it as “an abstract and subjective notion” that 
can “become confusing and difficult to apply;” and a standard that had “proven to be an additional 
burden on equality claimants, rather than the philosophical enhancement it was intended to be.” Id. For 
an analysis of the use of dignity by the Supreme Court of Canada, see James R. Fyfe, Dignity as 
Theory: Competing Conceptions of Human Dignity at the Supreme Court of Canada, 70 SASK. L. REV. 
1–27 (2007). 
 90.   See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.); Pleno de la Suprema 
Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Suprme Court], Acción De inconstitucionalidad 2/2010,  Novena Época, 10 
de Agosto de 2010, slip op. ¶¶ 260, 262, 269, 315 (Mex.); S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82, DIÁRIO 
DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367 (Port.); S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012 (B.O.E., No. 286, p. 
168) (Spain); Corte Constitucional [C.C.][Constitutional Court], julio 26, 2011, Sentencia C-577/11, 
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. 30) (Colom.). 
 91.  See Fourie, SA 524 ¶¶ 11, 15, 26, 28, 31, 47, 50, 53, 78, 79, 80, 108, 114 and 115. In a few 
paragraphs, like 36 and 54, the decision seems to link dignity with privacy. Id. ¶¶ 36, 54. In paragraphs 
36, 48, and 95, the Court mentions dignity, equality and privacy. Id. ¶¶ 36, 48, 95. Finally, there are a 
few paragraphs where it is unclear if the Court is referring to dignity as privacy, equality, or even as 
status derived from marriage. Id. ¶¶ 57, 61, 80 and 88. Paragraph 115, however, leaves no doubt that 
dignity for the Constitutional Court is closely linked to equality. Id. ¶ 115. 
 92. SCJN, Acción De Inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, ¶¶ 260, 262, 269, 315; S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012; 
Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-577/11. 
 93.  Fourie, SA 524 ¶¶ 15, 52, 57; SCJN, Acción De Inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, ¶¶ 235, 240, 
242, 254, 311; S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, ¶ 23; S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012. 
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Transforming the debate from marriage to equality opens up different 
fronts for advancing the protection of unmarried families.  Equality 
arguments require a comparison between the behaviors of married couples 
with that of the group seeking equal protection.  An equality discussion 
requires an elevation of the actual substance of relationships over the 
formality of a marriage certificate.  A review of substantive reasons for 
protecting certain associations over others forces us to look into the 
functions that each association performs. Real change is triggered by 
discussions on the basis of equality and autonomy.  If societies value the 
right of each individual to autonomously determine her personal life, 
denying the right to family life outside the married family becomes difficult 
to justify. 
1. The right to equality of family associations: the South African and 
Colombian approach to dignity and equality. 
Several courts have used equality and equal protection arguments in 
their decisions to allow same-sex marriage.  Two of these stand out for the 
richness of their analysis on equality and dignity.  Both South Africa and 
Colombia’s constitutional courts have based their decisions on same-sex 
marriage in the constitutional value of dignity.  Both courts provide an 
analysis of equal protection based on the idea of human dignity.  
Colombia’s 2011 decision on same-sex marriage created a legal limbo that 
has ended with new cases on the Court’s docket.94  This section analyzes 
the use of dignity and equality in both South Africa and Colombia. It ends 
with brief analyses of other decisions worth mentioning in this context such 
as those from Brazil, Portugal, and some U.S. courts. 
a. South Africa 
In 2005, the Constitutional Court of South Africa decided Minister of 
Home Affairs v. Fourie, giving the legislature one year to pass legislation 
that would allow same-sex couples to marry.95  The decision issued by 
Justice Albie Sachs used a narrative based on equality and dignity from 
beginning to end.96  It started by telling the story of Ms. Marié Adriaana 
Fourie and Ms. Cecelia Johanna Bonthuys, applicants in the first of the two 
cases that were decided together.97  The decision did not say anything about 
 
 94.  Redacción Justicia, Corte Constitucional Revive Discusion sobre Matrimonio Gay 
[Constitutional Court revives discussion on gay marriage], ELTIEMPO.COM (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www. 
eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-13528410. 
 95.  Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 156. 
 96.  See id. 
 97.  The second case against the Minister of Home Affairs was a case launched in the 
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who the plaintiffs were or what they did for a living.  The reader was only 
told that they were both women.98 
Finding themselves strongly attracted to each other, two people 
went out regularly and eventually decided to set up home together.  
After being acknowledged by their friends as a couple for more than 
a decade, they decided that the time had come to get public 
recognition and registration of their relationship, and formally to 
embrace the rights and responsibilities they felt should flow from 
and attach to it.  Like many persons in their situation, they wanted 
to get married. There was one impediment. They are both women.99 
The Court did not labor to present the plaintiffs as similar to 
heterosexual married couples.  The plaintiffs were presented as just two 
people who “eventually decided to set up home together.”100  This narrative 
of the facts is very different from the one that the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court presented in Goodridge. The South African story is about two people 
who care for each other and want to get married.  Goodridge, however, is 
about how same-sex couples seeking to get married were similar to all 
other heterosexual middle-class couples with access to marriage.  In Fourie 
we do not know whether the women in the case are professionals or on 
welfare, nor do we know if they are active members of a church or 
agnostics.  In Fourie, the Court first addressed if the law “den[ied] equal 
protection to and discriminate[d] unfairly against same-sex couples by not 
including them in the provisions of the Marriage Act.”101  The government 
advanced two arguments against the plaintiffs.  First, the government 
argued there was no constitutional right to marry.102  The Constitution 
“merely guaranteed to same-sex couples the right to establish their own 
forms of family life without interference from the state.”103  Second, 
marriage was historically and by nature a heterosexual institution.104  The 
Court answered both claims in a way that reinforced the principles of 
equality and the role of the South African Constitution in protecting 
families over marriages.  The Court reasoned that although the right to 
marry may not be in the Constitution, “[i]t does not follow . . . that the 
Constitution does nothing to protect that right, and with it, the concomitant 
 
Johannesburg High Court on July 8, 2004 by the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and eighteen others 
in the Equality Project. See id. ¶ 44. 
 98.  Id. ¶ 1. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. ¶ 45. 
 102.  Id. ¶ 46. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
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right to be treated equally and with dignity in the exercise of that right.”105  
These words marked the beginning of the court’s transformational 
approach to same-sex marriage.  Fourie did not dismiss marriage as an 
institution that should not be protected.  On the contrary, it devoted several 
paragraphs to explaining the benefits of marriage.  There were, however, 
no arguments advocating that marriage is by its very nature good for 
society.  The Court’s arguments were all based on tangible and intangible 
benefits and duties attached to legal marriages.  Among them, the duty to 
support one another was explained as one of the most important 
consequences of marriage.106  The decision also referred to consequences 
for the distribution of property and parental obligations.107  The overall tone 
of the decision emphasized that the meaning of marriage is not as important 
as the fact that it is a private choice that should be available, for the sake of 
equality and dignity, to same-sex couples. 
Fourie, therefore, was not a decision that rested on marriage, but 
rather on equality.  More important still, it was a decision that incorporated 
a concept of equality which did not demand assimilation into the 
heterosexual majority.  To the contrary, the decision embraced diversity not 
only with regard to individual choices, but also concerning the families that 
South Africa is willing to protect.  The lack of information about Ms. 
Fourie and her partner Ms. Bonthouys is essential to the point the court is 
making about diversity, both on the individual and familial levels. 
In particular, three full paragraphs of the decision were devoted to 
explaining “the right to be different.”108  This section of the decision started 
with an explanation of the role of the modern South African Constitution in 
representing “a radical rupture with a past based on intolerance and 
exclusion, and the movement forward to the acceptance of the need to 
develop a society based on equality and respect by all for all.”109  The 
decision went on to embrace individual diversity as a main component of 
equality: “[e]quality means equal concern and respect across difference.  It 
does not presuppose the elimination or suppression of difference.”110 
Here, it is important to note what the Fourie Court did not do. 
Accepting the right to be different does not prevent a country from favoring 
one type of family association over others.  Marriage, therefore, could have 
been defended as the preferred family association and the Court could have 
 
 105.  Id. ¶ 47. 
 106.  Id. ¶ 65. 
 107.  Id. ¶ 66–67. 
 108.  Id. ¶ 59–61. 
 109.  Id. ¶ 59. 
 110.  Id. ¶ 60. 
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granted it a privileged status while at the same time embracing individual 
diversity.111  Yet it refrained from doing so, stating that the “family as 
contemplated by the Constitution can be constituted in different ways and 
legal conceptions of the family and what constitutes family life should 
change as social practices and traditions change . . .”112  Explaining why 
marriage is not a constitutional right, the decision states, “South Africa has 
a multitude of family formations that are evolving rapidly as our society 
develops, so that it is inappropriate to entrench any particular form as the 
only socially and legally acceptable one.”113 
It could be argued that the multiculturalism specific to South Africa 
forms the basis for the Court’s decision to allow same-sex marriage.  From 
this perspective, the Court’s decision could be viewed as a discussion based 
on local traditions that cannot be used to establish any commonalities with 
foreign decisions.  In 2005, however, no ethnic South African groups 
performed same-sex marriages as part of their traditions.114  In addition to 
the Marriage Act of 1961, there was also a statute recognizing customary 
marriages.115  Therefore, the Court could have concluded that associations 
not included in the two statutes regulating marriage were foreign to the 
South African Constitution.  It decided, however, to rest its decision on the 
constitutional principles of dignity and equality, and broaden the scope of 
family protection. 
 
 111.  Although there is no express right to marriage in the South African Constitution, the 
document establishes under Article 15 on Freedom of Religion, Belief and Opinion that its protection 
“does not prevent legislation recognizing marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of 
religious, personal or family law.” There is enough textual foundation to justify a protection of marriage 
over other associations. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996. 
 112.  Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 15. 
 113.  Id. ¶ 59. 
 114. The first traditional same-sex wedding in South Africa was celebrated on April of 2013. See 
Africa’s first traditional gay wedding: Men make history as they marry in full tribal costume, 
DAILYMAIL.COM (Apr. 9, 2013, 4:06 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2306180/Africa-s-
traditional-gay-wedding-Men-make-history-marry-tribal-costume—say-t-wait-parents.html#ixzz 
3GYIJJh5D. According to South African LGBT rights advocate Melanie Judge, when the bill on same-
sex marriage was before the South African Parliament in 2006, “the Congress of Traditional Leaders of 
South Africa (Contralesa) submitted that ‘the institution of traditional leadership is the sole and 
authentic voice of the overwhelming majority of the people of South Africa living in traditional 
communities . . .  [and that] same-sex marriage is against nature, culture (all types of culture), religion 
and common sense, let alone decency,’” Melanie Judge, The culture of the chiefs is a set-back for 
gender and sexual rights, QUEERY: QUESTIONING THE (NOT SO) OBVIOUS (Apr. 18, 2012), 
http://queery.oia.co.za/2012/04/the-culture-of-the-chiefs-is-a-set-back-for-gender-and-sexual-rights/. 
 115.  Marriage Act 25 of 1961 (S. Afr.). South Africa regulates customary marriages through the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act N. 120 of 1998 (S. Afr.). The Act regulates marriages 
“concluded in accordance with customary law.” Id. § 1. Customary law “means the customs and usages 
traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form part of 
the culture of those peoples.” Id. 
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South Africa is famous for using dignity as a main pillar of 
constitutional doctrine.116  The 2005 Fourie decision referred more than 
forty times to the concept of dignity as a justification for opening marriage 
to couples of the same sex.117  Dignity, as used by the South African 
Constitutional Court, is closely tied to the inherent equality of all human 
beings.  In the words of the late Justice Arthur Chaskalson, 
Acknowledging that dignity is a difficult concept to capture in 
precise terms, the Constitutional Court has held that the 
constitutional protection of dignity requires us at the least “to 
acknowledge the value and worth of all individuals as members of 
our society” and to treat all with “equal respect and concern.” 
Building on that has given dignity a central role in the Court’s 
evolving jurisprudence.118 
The strong protection of dignity as a form of equality comes from an 
explicit reference to dignity in the South African Constitution,119 and a 
history of massive racial discrimination under apartheid.120 Dignity is a 
principle of equality of worth.121 Early in the Fourie decision, Justice Sachs 
cited Justice Cameron’s lower court decision: 
The sting of the past and continuing discrimination against both 
gays and lesbians’ lies in the message it conveys, namely, that 
viewed as individuals or in their same-sex relationships, they “do 
not have the inherent dignity and are not worthy of the human 
respect possessed by and accorded to heterosexuals and their 
relationships.” This “denies to gays and lesbians that which is 
foundational to our Constitution and the concepts of equality and 
dignity” namely that “all persons have the same inherent worth and 
dignity,” whatever their other differences may be.122 
Fourie also characterizes dignity as autonomy.  Justice Sachs wrote, 
“the capacity to choose to get married enhances the liberty, the autonomy 
 
 116.  Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson, Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of Our 
Constitutional Order, 16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 193, 196 (2000) [hereinafter Chaskalson, Human 
Dignity]; see also Woolman, supra note 70, at 73. 
 117.  Fourie, SA 524. 
 118.  Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson, Dignity As A Constitutional Value: A South African 
Perspective, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1377, 1382 (2011) (internal citations omitted). 
 119.  See S. AFR. CONST., 1996. §10 of the South African Constitution states that: “[e]veryone has 
inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.” Id. 
 120.  “Respect for the dignity of all human beings is particularly important in South Africa. For 
apartheid was a denial of a common humanity. Black people were refused respect and dignity and 
thereby the dignity of all South Africans was diminished. The new Constitution rejects this past and 
affirms the equal worth of all South Africans. Thus recognition and protection is the touchstone of the 
new political order and is fundamental to the new Constitution.” Chaskalson, Human Dignity, supra 
note 116, at 1381. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 15. 
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and the dignity of a couple committed for life to each other.”123  In other 
words, it is not marriage per se that gives individuals dignity, instead, 
dignity is derived from the capacity to choose to marry.  Most of Fourie’s 
references to dignity, however, relate to a sense of equality of worth that 
necessarily leads to equality of treatment.124 
The test, according to Justice Sachs, “whether majoritarian or 
minoritarian positions are involved, must always be whether the measure 
under scrutiny promotes or retards the achievement of human dignity, 
equality and freedom.”125  Recognition of a human being’s worth and the 
equality of treatment that follows from this recognition are at the core of 
the South African concept of dignity. 
Fourie not only opened the space for same-sex couples to access 
marriage, but on its way to accomplishing that, it created the conditions 
necessary for future decisions to focus on the protection of diverse families 
outside the marriage paradigm. 
b. Colombia 
In 2011, the Colombia Constitutional Court (CCC) was asked to 
review whether marriage limited to heterosexual couples was 
unconstitutional.  This development was inevitable, given the number of 
decisions that the CCC had issued in the previous fourteen years regarding 
the rights of same-sex couples.126  It was only a matter of time until the 
right to marriage was also placed on the Court’s docket. Decision C-
577/11, however, fell short of declaring the lack of marriage for same-sex 
couples unconstitutional. The CCC’s decision created a double standard for 
the constitutional protection of LGBT rights.127 
Similar to the Constitutional Court of South Africa’s decision in 
Fourie, the CCC’s ruling recognized a lack of protection for same-sex 
couples.128  Both courts considered that their role was to acknowledge and 
confront the inequality between same-sex and heterosexual couples, but to 
leave the specific remedy for this inequality to the legislature.129  The CCC, 
however, was less emphatic in its instructions to the Colombian Congress 
 
 123.  Id. ¶ 16. 
 124.  Id. ¶ 80. 
 125.  Id. ¶ 94. 
 126.  For an analysis of Colombian case law on LGBT rights see also Albarracin and Rivera, supra 
note 4. 
 127.  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 26, 2011, Sentencia C-577/11, 
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. 30) (Colom.). 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 101; see also Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-577/11. 
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than the South African Constitutional Court.  The Colombian decision did 
not mandate the legislature to open up marriage to same-sex couples.  
Instead, the Court explained that the legislature was the exclusive branch 
with the freedom to choose specific protections for same-sex relationships 
and to define the scope of those protections.130  Thus, the legislature was 
instructed to grant same-sex couples wishing to formalize their union all 
rights and obligations derived from the heterosexual marriage, either 
through marriage, or through a different institution.131 
The reasoning of the CCC is interesting because the Colombian 
constitutional framework, like the South African Constitution, but unlike 
most Latin American constitutions, openly recognizes the potential for 
diverse family associations.132  The constitutional “family” therefore, is not 
only the married family. The Colombian Constitution states that, in 
addition to the legal ties of marriage, a family is formed by the responsible 
desire to establish one.133 Consequently with the constitutional mandate, 
the CCC reinforced its case law on family diversity, stating: 
[T]he family that comes from the free union is also worthy of 
constitutional protection and the Constitution places it on an equal 
basis with the one that comes from marriage, because the State and 
society  guarantee an integral protection of the family “regardless of 
its constitution by legal or natural ties” and, therefore, the honor, 
dignity, and intimacy of the family are inviolable [and] the 
legislator “cannot issue regulations that create a differentiated 
treatment of rights and obligations between those who are married 
and those who are part of a permanent union.”134 
The decision could have followed the South African model, which 
reasoned that as long as there were benefits attached to marriage, same-sex 
couples that wanted to marry should have access to that institution.135  The 
CCC, however, restricted itself to a more literal interpretation of the 
Constitution that recognized heterosexual marriage as constitutionally 
protected and, at the same time, honored its case law on equality and the 
protection of the unmarried family.136  In order to do this, it affirmed that 
the heterosexual nature of constitutionally protected marriage did not 
hinder the possibility of protecting same-sex couples.137  Furthermore, the 
 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 42. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-577/11. 
 135.  Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 138–154. 
 136.  Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-577/11. 
 137.  The Portuguese Constitutional Tribunal had used the same reasoning before. The Tribunal 
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CCC accepted the petitioner’s basic claim that the lack of a legal means for 
same-sex couples to formalize their unions was unconstitutional.138  It did 
not, however, accept the obvious result of that reasoning: that marriage 
must be made available to same-sex couples.  Instead, the CCC gave a 
vague mandate to the legislature to provide same-sex couples with a 
formality: 
The legislature . . . has the task of finding a way to formalize and 
solemnize a legal link between members of a same-sex couple who 
may freely want to make use of it and, thus, the Court understands 
that the freedom to give the name it may deem appropriate to that 
link, as well as to define its scope, provided that, more than the 
name, what matters are the specific provisions that identify the 
rights and obligations distinctive to that legal relationship and the 
way such relationships are formalized and solemnized is reserved to 
the representative organ.139 
The CCC thus referred the matter to the Colombian Congress, just as 
other courts around the world have done before it.  The CCC, however, 
already had a robust case law in favor of equality and dignity of individuals 
of different sexual orientations and gender identities.140  Accordingly, the 
 
summarizes its options about the constitutionality of same-sex marriage as follows: a) same-sex 
marriage can be a constitutional mandate, b) same-sex marriage is constitutionally forbidden, or c) the 
constitution neither mandates nor prohibits same-sex marriage, and therefore Congress may regulate it. 
S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367, 22370 
(Port.). The Tribunal decided that the constitutional protection of heterosexual marriage did not forbid 
the legislature from opening marriage to same-sex couples. Id. 
 138.  Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-577/11. Same-sex couples already had access to de facto 
unions. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  See also Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 30, 1994, Sentencia 
T-539/1994 (Colom.) (declaring unconstitutional the censorship of TV ads showing same-sex couples 
kissing); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], septiembre 9, 1998, Sentencia C-481/1998 
(Colom.) (declaring unconstitutional the discrimination of gays in the military); Corte Constitucional 
[C.C.] [Constitutional Court], septiembre 18, 2003, Sentencia T-808/2003 (Colom.) (declaring 
unconstitutional the exclusion of gays from the Boy Scouts organization in Colombia); Corte 
Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 7, 2007, Sentencia C-075/07 (Colom.) (declaring 
that the property regime established for de facto heterosexual marital unions applied to same-sex 
couples); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], octubre 3, 2007, Sentencia C-811/2007 
(Colom.) (expanding to same-sex couples the right to include their partners into health care insurance 
plans); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], abril 16, 2008, Sentencia C-336/2008 
(Colom.) (expanding survivor’s pension benefits to same-sex couples); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] 
[Constitutional Court], agosto 20, 2008, Sentencia C-798/2008 (Colom.) (declaring the right to alimony 
for members of a same-sex couple after it separates); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional 
Court], enero 28, 2009, Sentencia C-029/2009 (Colom.) (declaring 26 different statutes constitutional 
only if applied on equal terms to same-sex couples). These statutes covered the concept of “family,” 
and “family group,” among others. For a detailed explanation of these decisions see Natalia Ramirez 
and Daniel Bonilla, Universidad de Los Andes Public Interest Law Group, Colombia, 19 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 97, 97 (2011). 
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CCC’s decision fell short of its own precedents at the very last moment.  
The Court reasoned that same-sex couples were a family.  It provided an 
analysis that made same-sex couples and different-sex couples 
indistinguishable from one another.  The decision was moving towards one 
and only one direction: marriage equality.  At the last moment, however, 
the Court chose to bypass its logical conclusion, choosing instead to fully 
defer to the discretion of the Colombian Congress. 
Interestingly, the Court established a deadline for the Colombian 
Congress to act.141  If by June 20, 2013, Congress did not reach a statutory 
solution, same-sex couples could go to a notary public “to formalize and 
solemnize a contractual link that may allow them to constitute a family, 
according to the scope that, by then, may be legally attributable to this type 
of union.”142  With this sentence, the Court made its decision completely 
circular. On the one hand, same-sex couples were like different-sex couples 
with one difference—marriage. Congress had to treat same-sex couples and 
different-sex couples equally, but it did not have to open marriage up to 
same-sex couples. Congress’ failure to find a solution by June 20, 2013 
would allow same-sex couples to become eligible to formalize their 
relationships before a notary public. This formalization would have legal 
effect, but in the absence of Congress’ action, there would be no law to 
legally recognize such formalizations. The decision, therefore, would only 
produce confusion if Congress did not comply with the Court’s mandate. 
The June 20, 2013 deadline passed. Not only did the legislature not 
pass a same-sex marriage statute, the Colombian Senate rejected a same-
sex marriage bill by a vote of fifty-one to seventeen.143  After a few weeks 
of uncertainty, notaries began issuing legal marriage certificates to same-
sex couples and some judges began to solemnize same-sex marriages.144  
However, other judges declared the same same-sex marriages performed by 
these judges as null and void.145  The situation was again brought to the 
 
 141.  Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-577/11. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Eduardo Garcia & Carlos Vargas, Colombia lawmakers reject controversial gay marriage 
bill, REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-colombia-gaymarriage-
idUSBRE93N1DT20130424. The Colombian Congress is formed by the Senate and the Chamber of 
Representatives. A bill has to be approved by both chambers in order to pass. Since the Senate rejected 
the bill, the Chamber of Representatives never had the chance to discuss it. 
 144.  See Kimberly Bennett, Colombia judge orders notary to perform same-sex marriage, JURIST, 
(July 29, 2013), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2013/07/colombia-judge-orders-notary-to-perform-same-
sex-marriage.php (explaining how a Colombian appeals judge ordered a notary to perform a same-sex 
marriage after refusing to do so). 
 145.  Anulan segundo matrimonio entre parejas gay en Colombia, EL ESPECTADOR (Oct. 18, 
2013), http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/anulan-segundo-matrimonio-entre-parejas-gay- 
colombia-articulo-453213. 
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CCC under two constitutional claims presented by same-sex couples.146  
Currently, it is unclear when the CCC will issue a decision that ends the 
current legal confusion.147 
c. Other examples of dignity and equality: Brazil, Portugal, and the 
United States. 
In 2011, the Federal Supreme Tribunal (STF), the highest court of 
Brazil, granted same-sex couples the right to enter into permanent unions, a 
right that heterosexual couples already enjoyed.148  This decision paved the 
way for the National Justice Council of Brazil to prohibit Brazilian 
authorities from refusing to perform same-sex marriages.149  The 2011 STF 
decision was based on several grounds, including the right to equality.150 
Namely, the Court concluded that all individuals must be treated with equal 
respect.151  A different opinion in the same decision referred to dignity in a 
way that implied a right to equality: “one is no more or less dignified by the 
fact of having been born a man or a woman.”152 The decision, however, 
placed a greater emphasis on dignity as linked to autonomy.153 
Also in 2011, the Constitutional Tribunal of Portugal (TCP) decided if 
legislation amending Portugal’s marriage statute to include same-sex 
marriage was a constitutional violation.154  The court arrived at the 
conclusion that its Constitution did not prohibit same-sex marriage and, 
therefore, the legislature could amend the definition of marriage to include 
same-sex couples.155 The Constitution of Portugal states that all 
 
 146.  Corte Constitucional Revive Discusión sobre Matrimonio Gay, EL TIEMPO (Feb. 20, 2014), 
http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-13528410. 
 147. Id. 
 148. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR 
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 611 (Braz.). 
 149. Resolução No. 175, 14 de Maio de 2013, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (Braz.). 
 150. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Luis Fux, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL 
DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 659 (Braz.). 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, ¶ 14. 
 153.  S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Luis Fux (“[A] Constituição de 1988 consagrou a família 
como instrumento de proteção da dignidade dos seus integrantes e do livre exercício de seus direitos 
fundamentais, de modo que, independentemente de sua formação—quantitativa ou qualitativa—serve o 
instituto como meio de desenvolvimento e garantia da existência livre e autônoma dos seus membros.” 
[“[T]he 1988 Constitution enshrined the family as a means of protecting the dignity of its members and 
the free exercise of their fundamental rights, so that, regardless of its constitution—quantitative or 
qualitative—the institute serves as a means of ensuring the guarantee of free and autonomous existence 
of its members.”]). 
 154.   S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367 
(Port.). 
 155.  Id. ¶ 22. 
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constitutional rights are based on the respect for human dignity.156  The 
TCP decision, therefore, mentions dignity several times.157  It is not clear, 
however, if the TCP is equating dignity with equality or autonomy.  
Overall, however, it is clear that the decision was based on the right to 
equality.158 Interestingly, the Spanish Constitutional Court took a similar 
approach.159 Using a parallel framework, it reached a comparable decision 
by relying mainly on the right to equality.160 
In the United States, two decisions post-Windsor granted same-sex 
marriage without entering into the institutional dignity argument provided 
by Windsor.161  Neither decision argued that marriage is a societal need that 
ought to be protected.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey and the Supreme 
Court of New Mexico decided these cases by focusing on the fact that 
same-sex couples were deprived of tangible benefits that came with the 
institution of marriage.162 This analysis is more apparent in Garden State 
Equality v. Dow than in Griego because the New Jersey Civil Union Act 
already granted all of the rights and benefits of marriage to same-sex 
couples in civil unions except the label of “marriage.”  The plaintiffs in 
Garden State argued that after Windsor, civil union couples did not have 
access to the federal benefits afforded to married couples.163  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court could have followed Windsor and engaged with the 
institutional dignity that comes with marriage. However, it did not talk 
about the humiliation faced by children, or the role of marriage in 
perfecting society.  It only focused on the benefits same-sex couples were 
 
 156.  See CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA [C.R.P.] [Constitution of the Portuguese 
Republic] art. 1 (Por.) (“Portugal é uma República soberana, baseada na dignidade da pessoa humana e 
na vontade popular e empenhada na construção de uma sociedade livre, justa e solidária.” [“Portugal is 
a sovereign Republic based on the dignity of the human being and on the popular will and committed to 
building a free, just and mutually supportive society.”]). 
 157.   S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010 ¶¶ 19, 22, 26. 
 158.  See id. ¶ 25. 
 159.  See generally S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012 (B.O.E., No. 286, p. 168) (Spain) (referencing the concept 
of individual equality throughout the opinion). 
 160.  See id. at 200 (holding there is nothing unconstitutional about the reforms to the Spanish Civil 
Code which allowed marriage between partners of the same sex). 
 161.  See generally Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 865 (N.M. 2013) (refraining from citing any 
institutional dignity-based rationale for the court’s holding); Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.3d 
336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013) (refraining from citing any institutional dignity-based rationale for 
the court’s holding). 
 162.  See Griego, 316 P.3d at 874 (explaining numerous “hardships” on the family as a result of not 
being able to marry); Garden State, 82 A.3d at 361 (“In the wake of the Windsor decision, plaintiffs 
have shown that civil union partners in New Jersey are being denied equal access to federal benefits, 
thus requiring that the right to marry be extended to same-sex couples under the equal protection 
guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution.”). 
 163.  Garden State, 82 A.3d at 342. 
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deprived of by not having access to the label of “marriage,” and whether 
this deprivation violated the court’s previous decision in Lewis v. Harris.164 
In Griego, the Supreme Court of New Mexico determined that New 
Mexico was constitutionally required to allow same-sex marriage.165 The 
court’s equal protection analysis did not focus on institutional dignity or on 
the need to protect marriage.  It only focused on whether heterosexual and 
“same-gender” couples were similarly situated and, therefore, whether they 
should be afforded the same treatment.166  The decision did not focus on the 
purpose of marriage, but on the purpose of New Mexico’s marriage laws.167  
The court indicated that the purpose of these laws was “to bring stability 
and order to the legal relationships of committed couples by defining their 
rights and responsibilities to one another, their children if they choose to 
raise children together, and their property.”168  It concluded that barring 
same-gender couples from marrying based on their sexual orientation 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the New Mexico Constitution.169 
Both Garden State and Griego took a pragmatic approach towards 
marriage. Both courts reasoned that as long as there were specific rights 
and obligations derived from marriage, there should be equal access to the 
institution that sets those rights and obligations. 
2. The right to choose a family: the Mexican approach to dignity and 
autonomy 
Dignity attached to autonomy provides a solid ground for future 
recognition of unmarried families. The Supreme Court of Mexico has 
developed a strong case law on dignity as attached to autonomy and its 
decisions on same-sex marriage reflect this approach.  Other countries that 
have based their same-sex marriage decisions on an idea of autonomy as 
attached to dignity include Spain and Brazil.  The cases analyzed below all 
focus on the right of individuals to make decisions as long as other 
constitutional rights are respected. 
a. Mexico: dignity and individuality 
In a 2008 decision, the Mexican Supreme Court (SCJN) elaborated on 
the concept of dignity as linked to the free development of one’s 
 
 164.  See generally id. (referencing Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006)). 
 165.  Griego, 316 P.3d at 872. 
 166.  Id. at 877–79. 
 167.  See generally id. (analyzing New Mexico’s statute). 
 168.  Id. at 872. 
 169.  Id. 
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individuality (libre desarrollo de la personalidad).170 This right includes, 
among others, the freedom to choose freely and autonomously to marry, to 
have children, and the right to sexual identity.171 The SCJN concluded, 
therefore, that choosing to live with a person of the same or of a different 
sex was also part of the free development of one’s individuality and 
therefore one’s human dignity.172 In a previous case recognizing sexual 
identity, the SCJN had already included a person’s sexuality within the 
concept of dignity as autonomy by stating that: 
[S]exuality is an essential component of a person’s life and her 
psyche; it forms part of the most personal and intimate sphere of 
human life.  That is why sexual self-determination is transcendental 
to the recognition of human dignity and its full development; and 
that is why the constitutional protection includes a free decision 
regarding sexuality.173 
In 2010, the SCJN was confronted with the question of whether the 
Mexican Constitution limited marriage to heterosexual couples.174  If that 
were the case, the Federal District Congress would have overstepped its 
authority by amending the definition of marriage established in Mexico’s 
Civil Code to include couples of the same sex.  That was the position of 
Mexico’s Attorney General, who challenged the constitutionality of the 
amendment.175  The Attorney General claimed that, although the Mexican 
Constitution did not contain a definition of marriage, Article 4 of the 
Constitution implies that marriage is an association that can only take place 
between a man and a woman when it states that a foreign woman who 
marries a Mexican man or a foreign man who marries a Mexican woman 
can only become Mexican citizens by naturalization.176  The Constitution, 
therefore, did not contemplate the option of a man marrying a man or a 
 
 170.  Alejandro Madrazo & Estefania Vela, The Mexican Supreme Court’s (Sexual) Revolution?, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 1883–84 (2011) (citing Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación 
[SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de amparo directo civil 6/2008, Novena Época, 6 de enero de 2009, 
slip op. 97 (Mex.)). The literal translation of “libre desarrollo de la personalidad” is “free development 
of personality.” I have translated it, however, as “free development of one’s individuality” because I 
think it better fits the meaning of this principle. Many countries include this principle (as principle or as 
a right) within their constitutions. In this paper we see this principle in the Mexican and Spanish 
decisions. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. at 1883. 
 173.  SCJN, Acción de amparo directo civil 6/2008. 
 174.  Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de 
inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010,  slip op. (Mex.). 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. (referring to the Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P] art. 
30(B)(II) (Mex.)). 
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woman marrying a woman.177 
According to the Attorney General, this provision necessarily meant 
that the Mexican Constitution limited marriage to heterosexual couples.178  
Therefore, the only family protected by the Mexican Constitution was the 
heterosexual, married family.179  Given that sexual orientation and identity 
had already been declared part of human dignity by the SCJN in 2008, the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage in 2010 would have to come 
from a distinction that did not offend human dignity.180  As has been done 
in other countries, the Attorney General looked to procreation for the 
answer.181  This approach did not convince the SCJN, which disregarded 
procreation as essential to marriage.182 Instead, the court focused on the 
right to dignity as autonomy, in other words, the right to the free 
development of one’s individuality.183  The court concluded that this right 
included the right to choose to marry.184  If sexual orientation is included in 
the concept of dignity, people consequently have the right to choose whom 
to marry.185 
The SCJN established a framework of dignity as related to the free 
development of one’s individuality, and only after that did it analyze 
constitutionality of same-sex marriage under an equality framework.  Like 
the South African Constitutional Court, the SCJN highlighted that the 
Mexican Constitution prohibits any discrimination based on sex or any 
other reason that may attack human dignity.186 
b. Other uses of dignity and autonomy: Brazil and Spain 
Brazil’s STF followed a similar rationale.  The STF concluded that the 
1988 Brazilian Constitution referred to the family as an instrument to 
protect the dignity of family members and their freedom to enjoy 
 
 177.  Id.. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de 
amparo directo civil 6/2008, Novena Época, 6 de enero de 2009, slip op. 97 (Mex.). 
 181.  Transnationally procreation has been the most recurrent argument against same-sex marriage. 
See e.g., SCJN, Acción de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, ¶ 93–95; Conseil Constitutionneil [CC] 
[Constitutional Court] decision No. 2013-669, May 17, 2013 ¶ 17 (Fr.); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 
at 882; Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 951 (Mass. 2003); Griego v. Oliver, 316 
P.3d 865, 871 (N.M. 2013). 
 182.  SCJN, Acción de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010. 
 183.  Id. ¶ 263. 
 184.  Id. ¶ 269. 
 185.  Id. ¶ 265. 
 186.  Id. at ¶ 315. 
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fundamental rights.187  Accordingly, the family is not a unit that restricts 
rights to adapt to other legal or even social obligations.188  On the contrary, 
the family fosters the development and autonomy of its members.189 
The idea of dignity was present in each of the opinions that form the 
Court’s final decision.  Dignity, the decision stated, is at the core of 
individual autonomy.190 The right to dignity means the right of an 
individual to choose how to live his life, and the creation of emotional 
associations that have “legal dignity.”191  The Court also reasoned that 
dignity is part of a core group of rights associated with autonomy: 
“[g]uarantees of liberty of religion and secular state prevent religious moral 
conceptions from guiding the state treatment of fundamental rights such as 
the right to dignity, the right to self-determination, the right to privacy or 
the right to freedom of sexual orientation.”192 
In 2012, Spain’s Constitutional Court also used the concept of dignity 
as autonomy to declare the constitutionality of the same-sex marriage 
statute passed by its Congress in 2005.193 The Court only referred to dignity 
once, stating that the new statute did not affect marriage for heterosexual 
individuals.194  For the Court, marriage was still the same institution; the 
new statute gave individuals the new option of marrying persons of the 
same sex.195  The Court reasoned that the statute respects “the guarantee of 
dignity and free development of one’s individuality,” as mandated by 
Article 10.1 of the Spanish Constitution.196 
3. The role of reality in the creation of legal concepts: the social 
family and the legal marriage 
In addition to focusing on autonomy and equality, several decisions on 
same-sex marriage refer to the need to recognize families, as they already 
exist.197  None of these decisions provide a concept of what families are, 
 
 187.  S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR 
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 611 (Braz.). 
 188.  S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Marco Aurelio, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR 
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 808 ¶ 14 (Braz.). 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, ¶ 15–16, 20, 26, 35. 
 191.  S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Carmen Lucia, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR 
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 695 ¶ 8 (Braz.). 
 192.  S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Marco Aurelio, ¶ 7. 
 193.  S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012, (B.O.E. No. 286, p. 168, 180) (Spain). 
 194.  Id. at 199. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Justice Ayres Brito stated that the Brazilian Constitution does not give a technical definition 
of the family and it is concept open to reality. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, ¶ 37. The 
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but they do recognize the existence of social constructions of family 
associations outside the limits imposed by legal systems.198  The highest 
courts in Canada, Mexico, Portugal, and Brazil interpreted their 
constitutional norms as adapting to new realities.  The decision of the Iowa 
Supreme Court in Varnum v. Brien also deserves recognition in this section 
for interpreting equality as an evolving concept.199  The remainder of this 
section shows how different courts view their legal institutions, including 
their constitutional frameworks, as evolving in nature.  These courts do not 
only embrace a concept of marriage that can change, but more importantly, 
they accept that the family as a legally protected unit changes in time, and 
constitutional concepts evolve along with these institutions.  The idea of an 
evolving constitution is present in the discussions of the Canadian Supreme 
Court, as well as Mexico, Portugal, Brazil, and some U.S. courts. 
a. The constitution as an evolving instrument: Canada and the U.S. 
states of Iowa and Connecticut 
Canada’s courts have on several occasions analyzed the institution of 
marriage.200 The ultimate decision on same-sex marriage came from the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Reference re Same-Sex 
Marriage.201  This decision arose from a request by the Governor in 
Council that the Court hear a reference on the legal amendment to the 
concept of marriage as “the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of 
all others.”202 The Governor in Council posed several questions for the 
Court to answer, including whether Parliament could modify the meaning 
of marriage.203 
The Court stated that Canada was a pluralistic society and one of the 
 
Mexican Supreme Court stated that the Mexican Constitution protects the family as a social reality. 
Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, 
Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010,  slip op. ¶ 235 (Mex.). The South African Constitutional Court 
stated that “South Africa has a multitude of family formations that are evolving rapidly as our society 
develops, so that it is inappropriate to entrench any particular form as the only socially and legally 
acceptable one.” Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) ¶ 59 (S. Afr.). 
 198.  Id. 
 199.   See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862, 877 (Iowa 2009) (“For sure, our nation has struggled 
to achieve a broad national consensus on equal protection of the laws when it has been forced to apply 
that principle to some of the institutions, traditions, and norms woven into the fabric of our society. This 
observation is important today because it reveals equal protection can only be defined by the standards 
of each generation.”). 
 200.  See EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada, [2003] B.C.J. 994 (Can. B.C. C.A.); Halpern v. Canada, 
[2003] O.R. 3d 161 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Hendricks v. Québec, [2002] R.J.Q. 2506 (Can. Que. C.S.). 
 201.  Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 (Can.). 
 202.  Id. ¶ 1. 
 203.  Id. ¶ 2. 
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main pillars of Canada’s constitutional interpretation was the idea of the 
Constitution as “a living tree which, by way of progressive interpretation, 
accommodates and addresses the realities of modern life.”204 The Court 
explained how the idea of the Constitution as a living tree applies to the 
concept of marriage by referring to other situations that were not originally 
contemplated by the Constitution such as women’s participation in public 
life, or Canada’s legislative competence over telephones through a power 
established before telephones were invented.205 
The Canadian Supreme Court’s decision did not expand on the notion 
of the family; instead, it was limited to answering the questions posed by 
the Governor in Council.  The decision, therefore, could be viewed as a 
conformist one that refers only to the possibility of expanding marriage to 
same-sex couples.  However, arguably, the decision did more than just 
expand marriage to same-sex couples.  First, it affirmed that Canada’s 
Constitution adapts to new social realities.  Second, it rejected the idea of a 
natural or supra-legal concept of marriage that can only be modified within 
the limits of its own nature.  The Canadian Court did not advance a 
functionalist concept of marriage, nor did it link marriage to the protection 
of the family.  Nevertheless, the Court rejected heterosexuality as essential 
or natural to marriage.206 Furthermore, it seems that the court’s 
interpretation of marriage only recognized that marriage is composed of 
two individuals as a natural aspect of the institution, and the free will of the 
parties to enter into it.207  Underlying the Canadian Court’s decision is the 
tenet that constitutional concepts evolve. 
Canada’s decisions on same-sex marriage came after several legal 
changes that minimized the difference between married and unmarried 
couples.208  The role of family law in Canada had already started moving 
towards recognition of families outside marriage and statutes ensured that 
those relationships were legally protected. Reference re Same-Sex 
Marriage, therefore, should also be read in conjunction with Canada’s prior 
decisions and regulations to understand the acceptance of functionalist 
 
 204.  Id. ¶ 22. 
 205.  See id. ¶¶ 22–23. 
 206.  See id. ¶¶ 21–30. 
 207.  See id. ¶ 27 (“The only objective core which the interveners before us agree is ‘natural’ to 
marriage is that it is the voluntary union of two people to the exclusion of all others. Beyond this, views 
diverge. We are faced with competing opinions on what the natural limits of marriage may be.”). 
 208.  In 1995, the Supreme Court of Canada held that for some purposes, the term “spouse” should 
apply to long-term cohabitants. See Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, 421 (Can.). As early as 1999, 
Canada’s Supreme Court recognized the property rights of same-sex partners after dissolution. See M. 
v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, ¶¶ 1–6 (Can.). 
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approaches towards families within Canada’s legal system.209 
Two cases in the U.S. also show a possible shift towards an evolution 
in constitutional interpretation.  The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in 
Varnum v. Brien,210 and the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health demonstrate the use of a living 
constitution approach towards same-sex marriage.211 
Varnum could be viewed as reinforcing the marriage paradigm.212  
Like the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Goodridge, the Iowa Supreme 
Court emphasized the good qualities of the plaintiffs to highlight their 
similarities with opposite-sex couples.213  The only difference between the 
plaintiffs and most Iowans, the court reasoned, was that they were 
“sexually and romantically attracted to members of their own sex.”214  The 
issue for the court was, therefore, to decide if same-sex couples were 
similarly situated to opposite-sex couples with regard to marriage.215  The 
court decided that restricting marriage to same-sex couples was a violation 
of the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution.216  The decision 
referred to marriage as a framework that provides stability: “[s]ociety 
benefits, for example, from providing same-sex couples a stable framework 
within which to raise their children and the power to make health care and 
end-of-life decisions for loved ones, just as it does when that framework is 
provided for opposite-sex couples.”217 
Varnum accepted marriage as a beneficial institution for society. 
However, it did so based on practical terms more than on an idealistic view 
of marriage. The court did not say anything about marriage making 
individuals better, or marriage giving a special dignity to the parties.  More 
importantly, along with its analysis on marriage, the court affirmed that 
constitutional interpretations evolve.  Citing a prior decision, it stated that 
Iowa’s “constitution is not merely tied to tradition, but recognizes the 
changing nature of society.”218 
The Connecticut Supreme Court in Kerrigan also acknowledged the 
 
 209.  See Joanna Radbord, Lesbian Love Stories: How We Won Equal Marriage in Canada, 17 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 102–03 (2005). 
 210.  Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862, 862 (Iowa 2009). 
 211.  Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 407 (Conn. 2008). 
 212.  See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 872. 
 213.  See id. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  See id. at 883. 
 216.  Id. at 906. 
 217.  Id. at 883. 
 218.  Id. at 876 (quoting Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999)). 
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possibility of more realistic conceptions of the family in the future.  The 
court recognized that constitutional norms must be interpreted according to 
the context in which they are being applied: 
In short, the [State] constitution was not intended to be a static 
document incapable of coping with changing times. It was meant to 
be, and is, a living document with current effectiveness . . . . The 
Connecticut constitution is an instrument of progress, it is intended 
to stand for a great length of time and should not be interpreted too 
narrowly or too literally so that it fails to have contemporary 
effectiveness for all of our citizens.219 
Both courts begin their analyses by accepting the possibility that legal 
and constitutional concepts evolve as society evolves. 
b. The family as a social construct: Mexico, Brazil, and Portugal 
In Accion de Inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, the SCJN had the task of 
interpreting the Mexican Constitution either in line with the Attorney 
General’s constitutional claim limiting the definition of family to the 
married family, or advancing a different position.220  The SCJN chose the 
latter and in doing so, it chose a transformative analysis of the role of 
family law over a conformist approach to legal regulations based on a 
narrow concept of marriage.  The Court based its decision not on how 
important marriage was for the Mexican people, but on a constitutional 
interpretation of the family that declined to privilege one type of family 
over others.221 
According to this, the role of the Constitution with regard to the 
family is not to encourage people to fit into one particular model of family, 
which is the result if only married families enjoy constitutional protection, 
or if married families are afforded more legal benefits and rights than 
unmarried ones.  The Constitution assumes, therefore, the role of protector 
of families that may or may not be desired by the democratic majority.  The 
reasoning is that as long as these families exist in Mexico, and if they are 
based on the principle of equality between men and women, they should be 
recognized as constitutionally protected.222 
 
 219.  Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 421 (Conn. 2008) (alteration in original) 
(quoting State v. Dukes, 547 A.2d 10, 19 (Conn. 1988)). 
 220.  Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de 
inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010,  slip op. ¶ 13 (Mex.). 
 221.  See id. ¶ 235. 
 222.  Even before analyzing the institution of the family, the court analyzes the principle of equality 
between men and women. See id. ¶ 233. Challenging polygamy as a constitutionally protected family 
unit on the basis of violating equality between men and women is beyond the extent of this paper. 
Under some constitutional schemes, however, it may be possible to advance a substantive equality 
argument that looks at actual polygamous social constructions and rejects them as structurally 
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The SCJN also analyzed the social relevance of marriage, and 
ultimately concluded that it was also a mutable concept that needed to 
adapt to social realities.223  The SCJN, therefore, is another high court that 
sees the law adapting to social needs rather than demanding that society 
adapt to a normative idea of the family. The Court confirmed this when it 
stated: 
Social reality demands an answer from the legislature . . . it is an 
undeniable fact that society and even marriage’s secularization and 
the transformation of human relations have gradually led to 
different forms of emotional, sexual, and mutually supportive 
relationships. At the same time, they have led to legal changes with 
regard to the institution of marriage, which has resulted in the 
redefinition of the traditional concept [of marriage] used during 
different periods of time . . . .224 
The Mexican decision began with an explanation of the role of the 
constitution as protecting families instead of mandating that people 
conform to a specific model of family.225  The Court then went on to 
explain that it was also incorrect to believe that the Mexican Constitution 
would only allow people to marry individuals of a different sex.226  On the 
contrary, the Court, like the South African Constitutional Court and the 
Canadian Supreme Court, considered that its own Constitution had to adapt 
to social changes.227 It analyzed marriage as an institution that could no 
longer be connected to procreation and, therefore, marriage could not be 
limited to heterosexual couples on the basis of that feature.228 
In a later decision, the SCJN had the opportunity to test its decision on 
the constitutionality of same-sex marriage in a case that challenged the 
traditional concept of marriage in the Mexican state of Oaxaca’s Civil 
Code.229  The SCJN not only reaffirmed its prior case law, but went further, 
stating that sexual orientation, as a suspect category, was subject to strict 
scrutiny.230  As such, Oaxaca needed to demonstrate that a measure limiting 
 
discriminating against women and unacceptable in a secular system. 
 223.  Id. ¶ 242. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  See id. ¶ 235. 
 226.  See id. ¶ 250. 
 227.  See id. ¶ 254. 
 228.  Id. ¶¶ 249, 250, 270. 
 229.  Primera Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo 
en Revisión 581/2012, Décima Época, 5 de Diciembre de 2012 (Mex.). 
 230.  Mexico’s Supreme Court uses two different standards of review: ordinary scrutiny and strict 
scrutiny. The ordinary scrutiny “applies to issues that do not directly affect human rights and have a 
broad margin of action and appreciation for the authority from a normative perspective such as on 
financial and economic matters.” Id. In contrast, strict scrutiny is used when the Court considers that 
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constitutional rights based on sexual orientation responded to a 
constitutionally imperative objective.231  The measure also had to relate 
directly to the State’s objective.232  The SCJN found that the regulation of 
marriage by the State of Oaxaca was aimed at protecting the family and 
concluded that this was an imperative objective.233  However, because the 
Mexican Constitution does not just protect the traditional family, 
comprised of a married father, mother, and their respective biological 
children, the Court did not consider the measure to be directly linked to the 
objective.234  Instead, the Constitution protects the family as understood by 
“social reality.”235  The SCJN is another example of a high court that has 
chosen not to focus on the right to marry, but on the right to a family. 
The same approach was adopted by Brazil’s STF and Portugal’s TCP.  
In addition to a narrative on autonomy and equality, several of the opinions 
that formed the STF’s decision spoke specifically about the need to 
recognize reality as the foundation for legal constructions, rather than the 
traditional ideal of a married family.236  Just like the Mexican decisions, the 
Brazilian opinions also conceptualized the family as a unit of mutual 
support.237  The major contribution of the 2011 Brazilian STF decision was 
 
there is a fundamental right at risk, for example, the right to equality and non-discrimination under 
Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution. See Primera Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación 
[SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo en Revisión 202/2013, Décima Época, 26 de junio de 2013, 10 
(Mex.). In the Oaxaca decision on same-sex marriage, the Court stated that heightened scrutiny was 
necessary because the law distinguished who could marry “based on the sexual preferences of 
individuals,” which is a suspect category. Id. The Court explained that a suspect category is implicated 
when a law “affects one of the criteria mentioned in the last paragraph of Article 1, [such as] . . . ethnic 
origin, nationality, gender, age, disability, social condition, health, religion, opinions, sexual 
preferences, marital status ‘or any other quality that may threaten human dignity and may have as an 
objective to destroy or undermine the rights and liberties of individuals.’” Id. For the Court, heightened 
scrutiny requires clear constitutional support: “[the statute] must pursue a constitutionally important 
objective.” Id. In addition, strict scrutiny requires that the challenged measure be directly connected to 
those constitutional objectives and be the least restrictive measure to effectively achieve that objective. 
SCJN, Amparo en Revisión 581/2012, at 33–34. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Id. at 35. 
 233.  Id. at 36. 
 234.  Id. at 37. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Justice Luis Fux stated in his decision that “homosexuals create continuous and lasting 
relationships of love and mutual support to share means and life projects. This simply happens, as it has 
always happened (though in many cases secretively), and for sure it will continue happening.” S.T.F., 
No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Luis Fux, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA 
[R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 659 ¶ 9 (Braz.). Justice Ayres Brito stated that the concept of family in the 
Brazilian Constitution has no orthodox meaning, but that is should have some basis in reality. S.T.F., 
No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Brito, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA 
[R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 625 ¶ 37 (Braz.). 
 237.  Id. ¶ 12. 
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the equalization of married and unmarried families.  By recognizing that 
there was no constitutional difference between the married and the 
unmarried family, the decision made marriage a real option, ensuring that 
any rights provided to married couples would also have to be granted to 
unmarried families in the future.238  The STF left the door wide open for the 
recognition of family units beyond the divide between same-sex and 
different-sex couple when it stated that the family was a cultural 
construction that evolves with time.239  The opinion criticized the 
patriarchal family unit and gave a historical account of the unit’s evolution 
towards an egalitarian concept of the family.240   
Portugal’s TCP used similar reasoning to justify the constitutionality 
of same-sex marriage.  The TCP argued that the Portuguese Constitution 
uses open concepts that allow the legislature to maintain a connection 
between legislation and social reality.241  The Constitution, the Court 
stated, enshrines a flexible concept of marriage that allows the inclusion of 
different social, political, and ethical convictions in different historical 
moments.242 
The decisions analyzed above leave the door open for couples to keep 
pushing for greater legal protection and recognition of non-traditional 
families beyond what has already been advanced. 
II. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 
The increased litigation over same-sex marriage gives societies an 
opportunity to review the reasons behind the divide between married and 
unmarried families.  Marriage, undoubtedly, serves some purposes.  It is a 
bundle of rights, benefits, and obligations that are allocated ex ante.  The 
question, however, is if there are any legitimate reasons to keep treating 
this bundle as a privileged institution instead of a pre-packed family 
association option that does not guarantee privileged treatment over other 
family associations.  A brief analysis of the purposes that marriage has 
served in the past, and the purposes it continues to serve today, 
demonstrates that when societies create a special status for the married 
family, they nevertheless fail to protect most real families. 
Marriage has served several purposes in the Western legal tradition.  
 
 238.  Id. ¶ 44. 
 239.  S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Marco Aurelio, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR 
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 808 ¶ 8 (Braz.). 
 240.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
 241.  S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367, 
22377  (Port.). 
 242.  Id. 
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For centuries, marriage was an essential part of the economic machinery, as 
a means of transferring and controlling property.243  Historically, children 
and wives were able workers with economic value per se, making them 
valuable to the production of wealth.244 Until recently, the control of 
women’s sexuality through marriage was also essential to ensure legal 
paternity.245  Marriage also played an important role in the continuation of 
the patriarchal family.  Historically, this meant that men were the heads of 
households and owners of everything inside their dwellings, from material 
goods, to slaves, servants, children, and wives.246  Lastly, because societies 
were structured on systems of class and race, marriage helped perpetuate 
racial and class homogeny.  In many Western countries these objectives 
were in place even beyond the 1960s.247  In all times and places, however, 
families have formed outside the marriage realm, but legal systems have 
failed to acknowledge them. 
A. New reality 
Today, the public narrative regarding family law and marriage in 
particular, has changed.  Few actors would be willing to argue openly that 
marriage still has the social purpose of securing men’s sexual monopoly 
over women and consequently securing legitimate offspring.  Adultery is 
 
 243.  LLOYD BONFIELD, MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS 1601-1740: THE ADOPTION OF THE STRICT 
SETTLEMENT 93 (1983); STPEHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY 
OR HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 45 (2005). 
 244.  D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 190 (2010). 
 245.  See CHRISTINA SIMMONS, MAKING MARRIAGE MODERN: WOMEN’S SEXUALITY FROM THE 
PROGRESSIVE ERA TO WORLD WAR II 6 (2009). 
 246.  The patriarchal family is common to most legal cultures regardless of historical periods. Until 
today we see its vestiges in different countries. The Roman family, inherited by countries of the 
continental legal tradition, was led by a pater familias, owner of everything within his household, and 
with power over his children until his death. BRUCE W. FRIER & THOMAS A.J. MCGINN, A CASEBOOK 
ON ROMAN FAMILY LAW 4–5 (Joel Lidov ed., 2004). In France, the wife owed obedience to the husband 
and the husband owed protection to the wife. The wife had an obligation to live with and follow her 
husband to wherever he decided to live. The wife could not trade or contract on her own. See CODE 
CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 213–15 (1804) (Fr.), reproduced at http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k1061517/ 
f55.image. Sir William Blackstone went even further in regulating the authority of the husband over his 
wife: “[b]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal 
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated 
into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; and is 
therefore called in our law-French a feme-covert, femina viro co-operta; is said to be covert-baron, or 
under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her 
marriage is called her coverture.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
¶ 442–445 (Wayne Morrison ed., vol. 1, 1765). 
 247.  Although many states had already amended their statutes, a general band on interracial 
marriage only came in 1967 with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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scantly penalized and, when it is, rarely legally enforced in the Western 
world.248 Children may still be legally classified as legitimate or 
illegitimate, but DNA tests offer far better proof of paternity than 
marriage.249  Arguing that marriage complies with a community’s interest 
in keeping races pure or social classes unmixed would also be virtually 
unthinkable in the modern era. Racial discrimination is blatantly 
unconstitutional in most Western countries, and constitutes a recognized 
violation of international human rights law.250 
Property allocation and economic stability are the only remaining 
justifications for marriage.  Before the massive entrance of women into 
labor markets, a woman’s main source of income was her marriage.251  
Women can now, of course, acquire property on their own.  Property 
allocation is thus no longer an objective of marriage but a consequence that 
flows from the existence of the institution.  Economic gains are likely a 
prime motivator for many people to marry, but Western legal systems tend 
to reject profit as a valid reason for marriage.252  Marriage serves as a force 
in the allocation of responsibilities for the welfare of individuals. A 
marriage certificate formally compels two individuals to care for one 
another, attempting to avoid or at least to delay the need for the 
government to provide basic care for those individuals.253  Public policies 
reinforcing or promoting marriage have been justified on reducing welfare 
 
 248.  THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN IN WORLD HISTORY VOL. I, ADULTERY: 
COMPARATIVE HISTORY 29 (Bonnie G. Smith ed., 2008). For adultery in the United States, see Kyle 
Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 359, 406–07 (2008). 
 249.  See LINDA A. MOONEY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL PROBLEMS 164 (2007). 
 250.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) art. 
1, 2, 23 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights]; Organization of 
American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 1, 24, Nov. 22. 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention on Human Rights]; European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 
[hereinafter European Human Rights Convention]. 
 251.  Prior to 1920s most women exited the work force at marriage. It was not until the 1950s that 
married women start participating in the work force almost in the same proportion as unmarried 
women. Claudia Goldin, The Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women’s Employment, Education, 
and Family, 96 THE AMERICAN ECON. REV. 1, 2–5 (2006). 
 252.  This is evident when comparing legal reasons for marriage annulment. An error in the 
economic conditions of one of the parties, even in the case of open deception from one party to the 
other, has rarely been accepted as grounds for annulment. The original Napoleonic Code included 
several articles regulating marriage annulment but none referred to a mistake in the economic 
conditions of one of the parties. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] tit. V, ch. IV (1804) (Fr.). Today’s French 
Civil Code also regulates marriage annulment in similar terms in Articles 180 to 202. See CODE CIVIL 
[C. CIV.] art. 213–15 (Fr.). 
 253.  Anne L. Alstott, Private Tragedies? Family Law as Social Insurance, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 3, 4 (2010). 
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responsibilities.254  It is not, however, legal marriage that reduces welfare, 
but rather economic and social stability.255  It is not the marriage license 
that magically stops people from falling into poverty. 
In the Western world, legal marriage in the twenty-first century is, for 
the most part, an individual choice. Western countries view arranged 
marriages as a violation of human rights.256  Communities largely define 
themselves through each member’s individuality.257  Communal respect for 
an individual’s autonomy has increased, and alongside it the concept of 
marriage has shifted from an institution for the realization of moral duties 
to one of privacy and freedom.258 
More educational and labor opportunities have also created a notable 
increase in autonomy for women.259  By the end of the twentieth-century, 
men and women were shaping family structures that were increasingly 
more detached from traditional precepts and external controls.260  The 
development of the right to privacy and the concept of individual rights 
have also contributed to three significant changes in family structure: 1) 
 
 254.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (“The purpose of this part is to increase the flexibility of 
States in operating a program designed to—(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children 
may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of needy 
parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and 
reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing 
and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of 
two-parent families.”) 
 255.  Judith Stacey, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples: The Impact on Children and 
Families, 23 QLR 529, 534 (2004) (“[t]here is considerable consensus among researchers that a 
disproportionate cause of the greater risks suffered by children in single-parent families derives from 
the lesser economic and educational resources that one adult, as compared to two, can normally offer a 
child.”); see also, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES, FAMILIES INDIVIDUALS AND THE LAW 
128 (2005). As Friedman states, in Finland and Scandinavian countries, children are commonly born 
out of wedlock because their parents choose not to marry. Id. They, however, are not worse off than 
children born within a legal marriage under the same socio economic circumstances. Id. (“To children 
in a stable, loving household, it can hardly make much difference whether Mother and Father have a 
marriage license and went through a ceremony or not.”) 
 256.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 250, art. 16(1)–(2); American Convention 
on Human Rights, supra note 250, arts. 2, 17.1; European Human Rights Conventions, supra note 150, 
art. 12. 
 257.  See Population Div. of Dep’t. of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, U.N. Secretariat, Partnership and 
Reproductive Behaviour in Low-Fertility Countries, 6, U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP.177 (May 2003), 
available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/reprobehavior/partrepro.pdf [hereinafter 
Partnership and Reproductive Behaviour]. 
 258.  “Where mid-nineteenth-century judges and other public spokesmen had hardly been able to 
speak of marriage without mentioning Christian morality, mid-twentieth-century discourse saw the 
hallmarks of the institution in liberty and privacy, consent and freedom.” NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: 
A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 197 (2002). 
 259.  Partnership and Reproductive Behaviour, supra note 257, at 5. 
 260.  Id. 
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more children born out of wedlock, 2) more heterosexual cohabitation 
outside marriage, and 3) increased visibility of same-sex couples. 
1. Marriage and children 
Since the 1960s, the Western world has experienced a marked increase 
in children born out of wedlock.261  According to statistics gathered by the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in 2009, 41% of births in 
the United States were to unmarried women.262  There has been a slight 
decrease since then to 40.7% of births to unmarried women in 2012.263 
These figures are more than twice the number found in 1980.264  Most 
developed countries are experiencing comparable trends, with countries 
such as Iceland, Sweden, and Norway having more than 50% of births out 
of wedlock.265 Most European countries are experiencing the same 
phenomenon.266 
A similar trend exists among Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries, with more than 50% of children born 
out of wedlock in France, Mexico, Slovenia, and the Nordic countries.267  
Even where the proportion of children born outside marriage is low, this 
percentage still represents an increase over prior decades.268 South America 
shares similar statistics.  The percentage of births out of wedlock in Chile 
went from less than 16% in the 1960s to over 50% in the early twenty-first 
century.269  The entire Latin American region has experienced a significant 
decline in the number of births within marriage.270  In 1970, around 75% of 
all children in Latin America were born within a married family.271  By the 
 
 261.  Id. at 44. 
 262.  JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., DIV. OF VITAL STATISTICS, BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2012 9 
(2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_09.pdf. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. 
 265. DIRECTORATE OF EMPLOYMENT, LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, ORGANIZATION FOR 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, FAMILY DATABASE: SHARE OF BIRTHS OUT OF 
WEDLOCK AND TEENAGE BIRTHS 1, available at www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database (last updated  
Feb. 24, 2012). 
 266.  Id. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  Id. at 2. 
 269.  Ximena Valdés, Notas sobre la Metamorfosis de la Familia en Chile, Meeting of ECLAC and 
UNFPA experts, (Nov. 22–23, 2007) available at http://www.eclac.cl/dds/noticias/paginas/9/30289/ 
Resumen.XimenaValdes.pdf. 
 270.  Ximena Castro Martin et al., Maternidad sin Matrimonio en América Latina: Análisis 
Comparativo a Partir de Datos Censales, CEPAL NOTAS DE POBLACIÓN NO. 93, 48 (Jan. 2011), 
available at http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/9/45549/lcg2509-P_2.pdf. 
 271.  Id. 
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beginning of the twenty-first century, however, more than 50% of children 
were born out of wedlock.272 
Historically, illegitimate children were not only social outcasts,273 but 
also legal outcasts.274  As the social stigma of having a child out of wedlock 
has faded, the legal treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children has 
balanced out to almost total equality.275  Marriage has thus become much 
less of a need and much more of a choice, at least when it comes to 
protecting children from legal disadvantages. 
2. Marriage and cohabitation 
Statistics on children born out of wedlock mirror a steady increase in 
the number of unmarried couples living together.  In the United States, the 
number of unmarried couples living together increased from 1.6 million in 
1980 to 4.1 million in 1997.276  In recent years marriage has continued to 
decline steadily with a 5% decrease in the number of married couples from 
 
 272.  Id. 
 273.  Kingsley Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 AM. J. SOC. 215, 215 (1934) (“[t]he 
bastard, like the prostitute, thief and beggar, belongs to that motley crowd of disreputable social types 
which society has generally resented, always endured. He is a living symbol of social irregularity, an 
undeniable evidence of contramoral forces; in short, a problem—a problem as old and unsolved as 
human existence itself.”). 
 274.  See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 24 (1996). 
 275.  The treatment of illegitimate children varies from country to country. The Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, which has 194 States Parties, establishes in Article 2.2 that “States Parties shall 
take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or 
punishment on the basis of the status . . . of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or family members.” 
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 2.2, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasis added). In 
several cases the European Court of Human Rights has decided that the differentiation between 
legitimate and illegitimate children is a violation of the European Convention of Human Rights. See 
Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979); Inze v. Austria, 126 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987); 
Mazurek v. France, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 9 (2006); Camp and Bourimi v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 
(2000); Brauer v. Germany, App. No. 3545/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (2009), Fabris v. France, App. 
No. 16574/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013). Article 17.5 of the American Convention of Human Rights states 
that “[t]he law shall recognize equal rights for children born out of wedlock and those born in 
wedlock.” American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 250, art. 17.5. Children in the United 
States born out of wedlock are subject to less stigma today, but they still experience some differences 
vis a vis children born within a legal marriage. As Richard Storrow points out, children born out of 
wedlock still “face legal obstacles to inheriting from their fathers.” See Richard F. Storrow, The 
Phantom Children of the Republic: International Surrogacy and the New Illegitimacy, 20 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 561, 577 (2012). For a detailed account on the differences between these 
children in the areas of inheritance, government benefits, and torts, see Cynthia Grant Bowman, The 
New Illegitimacy: Children of Cohabiting Couples and Stepchildren, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 437, 465 (2012). 
 276. Table 66, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (118 ed. 1998), cited in D. A. 
Habbegger, Living in Sin and the Law: Benefits for Unmarried Couples Dependent upon Sexual 
Orientation?, 33 IN. L. REV. 991, 991 (2000). 
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2009 to 2010.277  This is a trend outside the United States as well.278  In the 
last third of the twentieth century, cohabitation became popular among 
young professionals in Northern and Western Europe.279  In Latin America, 
cohabitation has increased and formal unions have decreased, especially 
among young couples.280  In Panama, Chile, and Mexico, the percentage of 
unwed cohabiting couples increased between 1985 and 2000, particularly 
amongst individuals between the ages of twenty-five and forty years old.281  
This trend cannot be interpreted as a total rejection of marriage, since 
numbers do not show if cohabitation is seen as a premarital arrangement or 
as an alternative to marriage.282 Both possibilities, however, have far 
reaching consequences for the relationship between marriage and family 
formation.  They show that marriage has lost its relevance as the primary 
gateway for starting a family.  Men and women have children and engage 
in committed relationships without linking those decisions to marriage.  
This demographic reality coincides with a more open attitude towards 
cohabitation in general.283 
3. Same-sex couples 
Until the mid-twentieth century, legal and political struggles in favor 
of gay and lesbian rights focused primarily on protecting individuals from 
homophobia and repealing sodomy laws.284  In the United States in 1960, 
every state had statutes criminalizing various types of consensual sexual 
relations between individuals of the same sex.285  Although there are cases 
 
 277.  D’VERA COHN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, SOCIAL & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 1 (2011), 
available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/12/14/barely-half-of-u-s-adults-are-married-a- 
record-low/. 
 278.  K. Kiernan, The Rise of Cohabitation and Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western Europe, 
15 INT’L J. L., POL’Y. & THE FAM. 1, 1 (2001); see also A.H. GAUTHIER, THE STATE AND THE FAMILY: 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FAMILY POLICIES IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 111-112 (1998). 
 279. Partnership and Reproductive Behaviour, supra note 257, at 23. 
 280. Jorge Rodriguez Vignoli, Tendencias recientes de las Uniones Consensuales en América 
Latina: Un Examen con Distinciones Socioeconómicas en Países Seleccionados, CEPAL MEETING OF 
EXPERTS, 6 (Oct. 28–29 2004), available at http://www.eclac.org/dds/noticias/paginas/9/19679/ 
JRodriguez.pdf. 
 281.  Id. at 5. 
 282.  Id. at 7. 
 283.  In response to a recent study, 39% of American answered that they believed marriage is an 
obsolete institution. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND THE RISE OF NEW 
FAMILIES: A SOCIAL & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS REPORT (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www. 
pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends-2010-families.pdf. 
 284.  See Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 
1558 (1993). 
 285.  Mary Bernstein, Liberalism and Social Movement success: the case of United States Sodomy 
Statutes, in REGULATING SEX: THE POLITICS OF INTIMACY AND IDENTITY 3, 3 (Elizabeth Bernstein & 
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of legal battles for the recognition of same-sex marriage prior to the 
1990s,286 the rise in the visibility of gay and lesbian couples is mainly a 
phenomenon of the 1990s.287  In 2001, The Netherlands was the first 
country to legalize same-sex marriage.288  However, the movement towards 
recognition of same-sex couples as legitimate associations began much 
earlier.289 Most regulations aimed at providing comprehensive legal 
frameworks for same-sex couples in Europe emerged in the 1980s and 
1990s.290  Denmark was the first country to pass a registered partnership 
regime for same-sex couples.291  The statute resembled marriage regulation 
in all aspects related to the relationship between the couple, but left out all 
parental regulations.292 Other countries that legally recognized same-sex 
couples followed this pattern.293 Since 1989, an increasing number of 
countries have created some type of regulation that recognizes the 
 
Laurie Schaffner eds., 2005). 
 286.  CAROL SANGER, FAMILY LAW STORIES, 28–30 (2007). 
 287.  This is apparent by the rise in the number of publications discussing same-sex marriage or 
same-sex unions in general. A limited search in the Library of Congress catalog shows thirteen books 
with the word “same-sex marriage” in the title between 1900 and 1989, forty-two between 1990 and 
1999, and 450 since the year 2000. An advanced search of the Worldcat database 
(http://www.worldcat.org/) showed five entries between 1900 and 1989 that contain “same-sex” in the 
title, and the word “marriage” as a subject when searching for books in English, excluding juvenile and 
fiction categories. The same search showed 160 hits from 1990 to 2000, and 974 from 2001 to 2013.  
When narrowing the search by limiting results by subject heading and marking only “same-sex 
marriage,” Worldcat shows 96 entries from 1990 to 2000, and 521 from 2001 to 2013. It does not show 
“same-sex marriage” as a search-limiting option when looking between 1900 and 1989. 
 288.  Ian Curry-Sumner, A Patchwork of Partnerships: Comparative Overview of Registration 
Schemes in Europe, in  LEGAL RECOGNITIONS OF SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS IN EUROPE, NATIONAL 
CROSS-BORDER AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES, EUROPEAN FAMILY Law Series No. 32 71 (Katharina 
Boele-Woelki & Angelika Fuchs eds., 2012); see also Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W. 
2d 335, 351 (Iowa 2013) (stating that with the legalization of same-sex marriage in Iowa, the 
presumption of legitimacy applies regardless of the gender of the spouses). 
 289.  Katharina Boele-Woelki, Colloquy, Le Partenariat Enregistre: Legislation Des Pays-Bas 44 
(1999), available at http://ciec1.org/CadrEtudeColloque.htm. 
 290.  LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andenæs eds., 2001) 
 291.  Macarena Sáez, Same Sex Marriage, Same Sex Cohabitation and Same Sex Families Around 
The World: Why “Same” Is So Different. 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 16 (2011). 
 292.  Linda Nielsen, Family Rights and the “Registered Partnership” in Denmark, 4(3) INT’L J. L. 
POL’Y FAM. 297, 298 (1990). 
 293.  In 2003, Belgium first passed a same-sex marriage law with restrictions on adoption. Only in 
2005 did the legislature open adoption to same-sex couples. Frederik Swennen & Yves-Henri Leleu, 
Belgium, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 57, 65 (2011). Portugal did the same in 2010 by 
expanding marriage to same-sex couple but keeping adoption open only to heterosexual couples. Sáez, 
supra note 291 at 9–10. In May 2013, Portugal granted same-sex married couples access to second 
parent adoption. Andrei Khalip, Gay Couples in Portugal win limited adoption rights, REUTERS (May 
17, 2013), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/17/us-portugal-gayadoption-idUSBRE 
94G0KV20130517. 
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legitimacy of same-sex couples.294 
These new legal landscapes have triggered developments in 
international law, immigration law, family law, and tax law, among other 
areas.  Countries face new legal issues related to the recognition of civil 
unions and same-sex marriage.  For example, old principles, such as the 
presumption of the legitimacy of children within marriage, have to be 
reinterpreted in light of same-sex marriage.295  Civil unions and registered 
partnerships create a set of legal family associations that did not exist 
before the 1980s.  New associations are accompanied by new legal issues, 
and countries have been adapting ever since to a more complex set of 
familial alternatives. 
Today, the traditional legal concept of marriage is contrasted with a 
reality that is more diverse, and includes families that are formed by adults 
and children who often are not tied to each other by blood or marriage.  
Individuals no longer see marriage as a mandatory step before forming a 
family, and look at marriage as one of several private alternatives.  Since 
the inception of no-fault divorce in many countries, marriage looks more 
like a private contract and has less of a public institutional character.296  
Countries have also detached the concept of parenthood from marriage, 
recognizing parenthood as a direct link between child and parent, 
regardless of the marital status of the parents.297  The struggle for the 
recognition of same-sex couples has brought into view the longstanding 
issue of the lack of recognition of complex family structures outside 
marriage. 
 
 294.  According to the organization Hiddush-Freedom of Religion for Israel, at least thirty-four 
states have provided foundational approval to same-sex couples. See Freedom of Marriage World Map, 
HIDDUSH FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND EQUALITY (Feb. 5, 2015), http://marriage.hiddush.org/about/ 
same-sex-marriage-and-civil-unions. According to the Pew Research Center, by the end of 2014, twenty 
countries allowed same-sex marriage either fully or partially. Gay Marriage Around the World, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/12/19/gay-marriage-around-the-
world-2013/. 
 295.  Kees Waaldijk, Others May Follow: The Introduction of Marriage, Quasi-Marriage, and 
Semi-Marriage for Same-Sex Couples in European Countries, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 569, 575–76 
(2004). Originally, the Dutch legislature did not want to apply the presumption of legitimacy to same-
sex marriage. It stated that “[i]t would be pushing things too far to assume that a child born in a 
marriage of two women would legally descend from both women. That would be stretching reality.” 
Kees Waaldijk, Explanatory memorandum on the text of the Dutch law on the opening up of marriage 
for same-sex partners (May 2, 2001), available at http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/Translation%20 
of%20Dutch%20law%20on%20same-sex%20marriage.pdf. 
 296.  JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM 72 (2002). 
 297.  JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW 
xiii (2000). 
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B. An old legal framework 
While the social concept of marriage has changed, most countries 
employ marriage as the fundamental paradigm of family law. In many 
systems, marriage and the family are still constitutionally equated with one 
another.  For example, the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 
states in its first chapter, entitled “Basic Rights,” that “[m]arriage and the 
family shall enjoy the special protection of the state.”298  Australia does not 
enumerate a list of rights in its Constitution.  Nevertheless, its Constitution 
states that Parliament shall have the power to “make laws for the peace, 
order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: . . . 
(xxi) marriage; (xxii) divorce and matrimonial causes; and in relation 
thereto, parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants.”299 
In Hungary, the Constitution includes within its General Provisions of 
Chapter I the protection of the “institution of marriage and the family.”300 
Colombia connects both institutions by stating that “[t]he family is the 
basic nucleus of society.  It is formed on the basis of natural or legal ties, 
by the free decision of a man and woman to contract matrimony or by their 
responsible will to conform one.”301 Furthermore, Article 42 of the 
Colombian Constitution has ten paragraphs dedicated to the regulation of 
marriage and family.302 
Meanwhile, in Peru, the Constitution states that it protects the family 
and “promotes marriage” as recognition that marriage and family are 
“natural and fundamental institutions of society.”303 Similarly, El 
Salvador’s Constitution states that “[m]arriage is the legal foundation of the 
family,” and goes on to say that “[t]he State will encourage marriage.”304  It 
does, nonetheless, add that “[t]he lack of [marriage] will not affect the 
enjoyment of rights that may be established in favor of the family.”305 A 
similar connection is found in the Constitutions of other Latin American 
countries such as Brazil,306 Costa Rica,307 Cuba,308 Guatemala,309 
 
 298.  GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC 
LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBI. VI (Ger.). 
 299.  AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 51. 
 300.  A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY] 
art. 15. 
 301.  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art.42. 
 302.  Id. 
 303.  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PERÚ [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION OF PERU] art. 4. 
 304.  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL SALVADOR [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION OF EL SALVADOR] art. 32. 
 305.  Id. 
 306.  CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 226 (Braz.) 
 307.  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COSTA RICA [C.P.] [POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF COSTA RICA] 
art. 51. 
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Honduras,310 Panama,311 and the Dominican Republic.312 All these 
protections, however, look small when compared to Ireland’s constitution.  
In Article 41.3.1, Ireland pledges “to guard with special care the institution 
of marriage, on which the family is founded, and to protect it against 
attack.”313  It goes on to constitutionalize the role of women in the family 
by considering their role at home as instrumental to the common good and 
ensuring that mothers do not have to work for economic reasons “to the 
neglect of their duties in the home.”314 
In the same vein, international human rights instruments refer to 
marriage and family as naturally connected.  Article 16 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights refers to the right to marry, and immediately 
after states, “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”315 The 
European Convention on Human Rights also makes the connection 
between family and marriage by stating, “[m]en and women of 
marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according 
to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.”316  The American 
Convention on Human Rights follows the same trend by recognizing under 
the “Rights of the Family” that “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society” and “[t]he right of men and women of marriageable 
age to marry and to raise a family.”317 
There is, therefore, a disconnection between the strict regulation of 
marriage, that is, the legal meaning of marriage, and the reality of family 
formation. On the one hand, family law is based on a rigid structure of 
formal ties where marriage occupies the privileged position of the most 
complete relationship. A man and a woman linked by marriage enjoy 
protections and rights that couples linked by ties other than marriage do not 
have access to. More importantly, marriage changes the nature of a 
relationship from an association of two individuals to a complex web of 
 
 308.  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE CUBA [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION OF CUBA] art. 35. 
 309.  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE GUATEMALA [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION OF GUATEMALA] art. 47. 
 310.   CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION OF 
HONDURAS] art. 111. 
 311.  CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PANAMÁ [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION OF PANAMA] 
art. 52. 
 312.  CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA [C.P.] [CONSTITUTION OF THE DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC] art. 55. 
 313.  Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 41(3)(1). 
 314.  Id. art. 41(2)(1)–(2). 
 315.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 250, art. 16(3). 
 316.  European Human Rights Convention, supra note 250, art. 12. 
 317.  American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 250, art. 17(1)–(2). 
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family relationships.  It creates diversity of kinship as no other association 
does.  On the other hand, real families do not necessarily fit the options 
provided by family law.  Real families are formed by dynamic movements 
of individuals coming and going, creating support networks that do not 
correspond to ties by blood or sex.  Real families are linked by dependency 
and support, and legal families are linked by law, regardless of whether 
there is real dependency or real support.  There is a divide between the 
families that societies aspire to have, and the families that actually form 
within those societies.318 
This distinction refers to the dichotomy between the legal creation of 
an ideal family that reflects a specific society, and the families that actually 
exist in our communities.319 The legal family is a hierarchical, heterosexual, 
patriarchal, and formalistic unit that starts with marriage.  Family law based 
on this paradigm regulates how to start a family, what to do within the 
family, and how to exit the family.  Instead, reality shows the complexities 
of relationships aimed at caring for and supporting individuals, which 
sometimes coincides with marital relations, and at many other times 
develops outside of the realm of marriage or even sex.  Legal systems, 
however, are still focused on constructing families through marriage and 
offering these families a beneficial legal framework.  Thus, real families 
outside marriage are treated as anomalies that ought to be regulated only to 
the extent necessary to avoid unfairness.  A good example of a regulation 
based on fairness is found in the decision on de facto unions issued by the 
Family Court of Costa Rica in 2004.320 In its opinion, the court states “[i]t 
is interesting to note that the topic of de facto unions has been a whole 
process [sic] in which statistics that reflect reality within our social fabric 
demonstrate a disconnect with our legal regulations, and in order to avoid 
injustices, some situations have been, little by little, recognized and 
protected.”321 
Marriage, instead, is regulated as an aspirational social institution; a 
valuable institution that brings something that nothing else brings to 
society.  Marriage is treated as an essential component in the construction 
of the polis.  From this perspective, marriage is not only a family law 
institution, but also a civic institution.  A citizen fulfills his civic duties not 
only by participating in public life, but by marrying another person and 
having children who will also become good citizens, and who in turn 
 
 318.  See ALISON DIDUCK, LAW’S FAMILIES, 21–30 (2003). 
 319.  See id. 
 320.  T. Familia, junio 24, 2004, Sentencia 1040/04 (Costa Rica). 
 321.  Id. ¶ III. 
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should marry.  Marriage, thus, is viewed as a good in itself, regardless of 
any material benefits it may bring. The argument for marriage as an 
essentially “good” institution has permeated most of the struggle to keep 
marriage a heterosexual privileged institution.322 
Cohabitation outside marriage has been to the family what illegal 
immigration has been to the state.  In different periods, countries have been 
forced to redefine citizenship or to include as citizens individuals who were 
originally not welcomed as such.323  The same has happened with families. 
Countries have been forced by reality to recognize individuals who were 
once unwelcome in the legal family structure as family members.  With the 
rise of cohabitation, the stigma of illegitimacy faded away and claims for 
equality between children born in and out of wedlock became more 
common.324 By abolishing the distinction between children born in 
marriage and out of wedlock, states recognized direct family ties between 
parent and child without marriage as the intermediary.325 
Every time a court has granted rights to unmarried couples based on 
performing the same functions as married couples, they have recognized 
that family ties are possible beyond what formal statutes have intended.  
Courts approach this recognition as based on a need for fairness.  For 
example, in cases for infliction of emotional distress, some courts have 
refused to use marriage as a bright line to reject complaints for 
negligence.326 
 
 322.  See id. ¶ II.A. 
 323.  This is apparent in the United States with the discussion on immigration reform.  It is no 
coincidence that the Republican Party was suddenly interested in finding a solution to Latino illegal 
immigrants right after they failed to attract the Latino vote in the 2012 presidential election. See Pramila 
Jayapal, Why Don’t Republicans Want to Win?, POLITICO (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.politico.com/ 
story/2013/08/why-dont-republicans-want-to-win-95247.html. 
 324.  As Friedman states, “in an age of cohabitation, there is no place in the legal order for the 
concept of bastardy.” FRIEDMAN, supra note 255, at 127. 
 325.  The U.S. Supreme Court made this direct relationship clear when it struck down the 
difference between legitimate and illegitimate children. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71–72 
(1968) (“The rights asserted here involve the intimate, familial relationship between a child and his own 
mother. When the child’s claim of damage for loss of his mother is in issue, why, in terms of “equal 
protection,” should the tortfeasors go free merely because the child is illegitimate? . . . Legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother. These 
children, though illegitimate, were dependent on her; she cared for them and nurtured them; they were 
indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense; in her death they suffered wrong in the sense that 
any dependent would.”). 
 326.  This has been the approach of several courts in the United States. In order to determine if a 
relationship meets the required standards for one of the parties to make a claim of emotional harm when 
the other party has been injured, the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that a court should “take 
into account the duration of the relationship, the degree of mutual dependence, the extent of common 
contribution to a life together . . . and the manner in which they related to each other in attending to 
life’s mundane requirements.” Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255 (N.H. 2003). The Graves court also 
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In 1990, Colombia created a legal regime for unmarried heterosexual 
couples.327  This recognition was the basis upon which LGBT activists in 
Colombia sought recognition of same-sex couples.  In a line of decisions, 
the Constitutional Court of Colombia granted same-sex couples the same 
rights originally established by law for heterosexual de facto marital 
unions.  The Court also expanded the rights associated with de facto 
unions, further reducing the difference between married and unmarried 
couples.328  In each decision, the Court adopted a functionalist approach to 
families by comparing what married and unmarried couples do, and 
concluding that if these couples fulfill similar objectives and behave 
similarly, statutes granting specific benefits should not distinguish between 
these families.329  This approach is derived from the Court’s strong 
protection of autonomy: 
It is thus clear that the current legal system, founded on respect for 
human dignity, tolerance, solidarity and personal autonomy does 
not allow the State to create legal tools to stigmatize some sexual 
behaviors and, to a certain extent, hinder the free exercise of 
sexuality. Such conduct would not only annul the right to the free 
development of personality and intimacy, but also the pluralism that 
our own constitutional system accepts and mandates to protect.330 
Although the regulation of cohabitation outside marriage has emerged 
out of demands for fairness, the increase in the number of regulations that 
recognize unmarried couples as family associations has also had an impact 
on the perception of marriage as the normative ideal.  States or countries 
 
cites cases in Hawaii, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and West Virginia to support its 
position. Id. 
 327.  In 1990, the Colombian Congress passed Law 54. Article 1 of the law defines the “marital de 
facto union” as one “formed by one man and one woman who, without being married, have an 
exclusive and permanent life-partnership.” L. 54/90, diciembre 28, 1990, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 
(Colom.). 
 328.  Colombia has gone as far as recognizing pension benefits for the cohabitant of a deceased, 
even when there is a legal spouse as well. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], octubre 
22, 2008, Sentencia C-1035/08 (Colom.). The Court recognized pension benefits for cohabitants and 
pension-sharing when the deceased cohabited with a legal spouse. Following the tradition of the 
Napoleonic Code, the Colombian Civil Code includes the legal spouse of the deceased as mandatory 
intestate heir. CODIGO CIVIL [Civil Code] [C.C.] art. 1040 (Colom.). In 2012, however, the 
Constitutional Court stated that the statute was conditionally constitutional “as long as it is understood 
that it encompasses the permanent partner of different or same sex who formed with the deceased, to 
whom [he or she] survives, a de facto union.” Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], marzo 
22, 2012, Sentencia C-238/12 (Colom.); see also Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], 
abril 13, 2011, Sentencia C-283/11 (Colom.). 
 329. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 26, 2011, Sentencia C-577/11, Gaceta 
Judicial [G.J.] (No. 30) (Colom.). 
 330. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 14, 1999, Sentencia C-507/99, ¶ 5.3 
(Colom.). 
22_SAEZ_FORMAT 2 MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2015  3:18 PM 
180 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 25:125 
that have afforded same-sex couples some formal recognition and rights 
also tend to accept same-sex marriage in later decisions as a logical next 
step.331 Keeping marriage as the paradigm of family formation is 
increasingly less justifiable.  It is also increasingly unfair. 
Two examples illustrate the unfairness of constructing the legal family 
around marriage, to the detriment of the recognition of unmarried families. 
1. The husband as the father and the father as a stranger. 
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted 
with the task of determining if the relationship between a daughter and her 
biological father was worth the protection of the law or if, on the contrary, 
legal marriage outweighed biology to the point of denying the daughter’s 
biological father paternity in favor of the mother’s legal husband.332 The 
Court chose the latter.333 Michael had an affair with Carole while she was 
married to Gerald.334 From this affair, Victoria was born.335 Gerald and 
Carole separated and Michael and Carole lived together for a few 
months.336  Michael developed a relationship with Victoria during this 
time.337  When Gerald and Carole reunited, Michael filed a filiation action 
to establish paternity and visitation rights.338  The Superior Court granted 
Gerald’s summary judgment motion because under California law, he was 
presumed to be Victoria’s father, and because he was living with Victoria’s 
mother at the time Victoria was born.  Michael and Victoria appealed, but 
the California Court of Appeals affirmed.339  Under California law, a child 
born to a married woman living with her husband, who is neither impotent 
nor sterile, was presumed to be a child of the marriage.  This presumption 
could be rebutted in limited circumstances by the husband or wife only.340 
The Supreme Court had to determine if the statute violated the biological 
father’s procedural and substantive due process rights, and the child’s equal 
protection and due process rights.341 
 
 331.  All of the countries and states reviewed in this Article have provided some formal recognition 
to unmarried same-sex couples before granting same-sex marriage. 
 332.  See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 333.  Id. at 130–31. 
 334.  Id. at 113. 
 335.  Id. at 114. 
 336.  Id. 
 337.  Id. at 113–14. 
 338.  Id. at 114. 
 339.  Id. at 116. 
 340.  Id. at 113 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (West 2014) (repealed 1992)). CAL. FAM. CODE § 
7611 (West 2014), has replaced that provision with a similar regulation. 
 341.  Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113, 116. 
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Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, quickly dismissed any 
possibility of allowing dual fatherhood.  “At the outset,” Justice Scalia 
stated, “it is necessary to clarify what he [Michael] sought and what he was 
denied. California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual 
fatherhood.”342  After that, it was clear that only one of the two men 
seeking recognition of his paternity could win.  Michael had biology on his 
side and Gerald had marriage.  Both had bonded with the child.  Justice 
Scalia considered the statute constitutional because California has an 
interest in family stability.343  He quoted the court of appeals’ decision 
stating, “[t]he conclusive presumption is actually a substantive rule of law 
based upon a determination by the Legislature as a matter of overriding 
social policy, that given a certain relationship between the husband and 
wife, the husband is to be held responsible for the child, and that the 
integrity of the family unit should not be impugned.”344 
According to this interpretation, a natural father and his daughter are 
not a family if marriage interferes.  That link cannot be destroyed because 
it doesn’t exist legally. There is, however, a family between Carole and 
Gerald that must not be disturbed.  The Court refused to find a liberty 
interest in Michael’s relationship with Victoria because Michael’s interest 
was not “traditionally protected by our society.”345  Justice Scalia’s opinion 
reinforced the communion between the legal and marital family, and the 
divide between legal and socially constructed families.  In the eyes of the 
majority, the relationship between Michael and Victoria had not been 
historically treated as a protected unit or granted a special protection. 346  
On the contrary, the marital unit has been historically awarded a special 
protection against claims such as Michael’s.347  The U.S. Supreme Court 
did not see the possibility of accepting familial ties that simultaneously 
recognize the actual relationship between Victoria and Gerald, and a 
separate but equally valid relationship between Victoria and her natural 
father, Michael. 
 
 342.  Id. at 118 (emphasis added). 
 343.  See id. at 131 (“When the husband or wife contests the legitimacy of their child, the stability 
of the marriage has already been shaken. In contrast, allowing a claim of illegitimacy to be pressed by 
the child—or, more accurately, by a court-appointed guardian ad litem—may well disrupt an otherwise 
peaceful union.”). 
 344.  Id. at 119–20. 
 345.  Id. at 122. 
 346.  See id. at 124 (stating it is “impossible” to find that Michael and Victoria’s “situation” has 
been historically treated as a protected family unit, and that it had not “been accorded special 
protection” on any other basis). 
 347.  See id. at 125 (“[T]he evidence shows that even in modern times . . . the ability of a person in 
Michael’s position to claim paternity has not been generally acknowledged.”). 
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2. The estranged wife as the family and the long-term companion as 
a stranger 
Eliana Perez Carreño and Manuel Alvarez Jimenez married in Chile in 
1950 and separated before 1962.348 Gladys Grez Jahnsen started a 
relationship with Manuel Alvarez Jimenez in 1962 and they lived together 
until 1988, when Manuel died.349  During their life together, Gladys and 
Manuel acquired real estate.350  According to the Chilean Civil Code, the 
wife and children of the deceased are his legal heirs.351  The unmarried 
partner is not.352 Gladys requested that the Court recognize a shared 
property interest between herself and Manuel over assets that they had 
acquired together.353 The lower court granted Gladys’ request and 
recognized fifty percent of Manuel’s estate as hers.354  The court of appeals 
affirmed.355  The Supreme Court of Chile reversed, holding that the lower 
courts erred by dismissing the Civil Code’s estate rules.356  Gladys lived 
with Manuel for thirty-four years but her relationship was completely 
invisible to the court.  No mutual support, no shared effort counted during 
this time. Manuel’s relationship with his legal wife was the only 
relationship that the Court was willing to see. 
Although these examples may be met by different responses from 
today’s courts, they illustrate the shortsightedness of the married family 
protection. There are millions of stories like this around the world: women 
and men who have raised the children of their partners but do not count as 
families at the moment of their partners’ death; same-sex couples who are 
not protected under domestic violence statutes because they are not 
considered family;357 gay men and lesbian women who cannot adopt their 
 
 348.  Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 12 mayo 2005, “Grez Jahnsen Gladys 
del Carmen c. Alvarez Pérez Manuel Miguel y otros”  Rol de la causa: 5508-1998, REVISTA DE 
DERECHO Y JURISPRUDENCIA [R.D.J.] No. 2, p.233–44 (Chile), available at http://www.scielo.cl/ 
scielo.php?pid=S071809502005000200012&script=sci_arttext. The decision is divided in two parts, 
following the Chilean system of structuring legal decisions. Part I is titled “Vistos,” and describes the 
hearing and decision being challenged. In this case, the appellants challenged the decision of the 
Thirteenth Civil Court of Santiago declaring that assets between Gladys Grez Jahnsen and Manuel 
Alvarez Jimenez were communal. Part II provides the Court’s reasoning and decision reversing the 
lower court. 
 349.  Id. at Part I, ¶ 2. 
 350.  Id. 
 351.  Id. at Part II, ¶ 5. 
 352.  Id. 
 353.  Id. at Part I, ¶ 2. 
 354.  Id. at Part I, ¶ 5. 
 355.  Id. at Part I, ¶ 6. 
 356.  Id. at Part II, ¶ 11. 
 357.  See Pueblo v. Ruiz, 159 D.P.R. 194, 202 (P.R. 2003) (“[E]l propósito cardinal de la política 
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partners’ children because of their sexual orientation;358 adults raising the 
children of friends or former partners who died or are too ill to care for 
those children. 
Undeniably, same-sex marriage benefits many families.  Along the 
path toward recognition, it is important not to close the door for the 
recognition of other types of associations that are even more invisible to the 
law. Many people do not get married or marry after periods of 
cohabitation.359  This is not always because they are of the same sex, but 
because their lives are too complex, and their most stable support networks 
are not tied to emotional relationships based on sexual attraction and 
romantic love. These relationships are built on extended support by 
traditional kinship, such as grandparents, aunts, cousins, or other groups of 
people such as community members, godparents, and friends. The question 
of what families do, and whether we will recognize them without making 
them take their case to court (where they will most likely lose), is more 
important than who should be treated as family ex ante.  People rely on 
different family members for different issues. Family law needs to 
acknowledge and understand a complex web of relationships.  It is not the 
aim of this Article to elaborate on how exactly to recognize functional 
families. However, any reflections on what families are and how family 
law should protect them requires acknowledging the flaws of a marriage-
centric system. 
 
pública enunciada es fortalecer la institución de la familia, que se visualiza como una política que surge 
y se ampara en la unión sentimental y legal entre un hombre y una mujer.” [“[T]he main purpose of the 
public policy [advanced in the domestic violence statute] is to strengthen the institution of the family, 
which is seen as one that emerges from and is protected by the emotional and legal union between a 
man and a woman.”]). 
 358.  See X and Others v. Austria, App. No. 19010/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013) (finding Austria in 
violation of the European Convention of Human Rights for not allowing second parent adoption for 
same-sex couples while allowing it for unmarried heterosexual couples). The same court, however, did 
not find it discriminatory that a same-sex couple could not access second parent adoption because 
heterosexual unmarried couples did not have access to it as well. Gas and Dubois v. France, App. No. 
25951/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) (“[M]arriage confers a special status on those who enter into it. The 
exercise of the right to marry is protected by Article 12 of the Convention and gives rise to social, 
personal and legal consequences.”). 
 359.  For the United States, see CASEY E. COPEN ET AL, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 
FIRST MARRIAGES IN THE UNITED STATES: DATA FROM THE 2006–2010 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY 
GROWTH 2 (2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr049.pdf. In Europe, there are 
striking variations between Northern European countries where cohabitation is very prominent and 
Southern European countries where it is less prevalent. Throughout Europe, however, there is an 
increase in cohabitation patterns. See Kathleen Kiernan, Redrawing the Boundaries of Marriage, 66 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAM. 980, 985 (2004). For a rise in cohabitation trends in Latin America, see generally 
Albert Esteve, Ron Lesthaeghe & Antonio Lopez-Gay, The Latin American Cohabitation Boom, 1970 
2007, 38 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 55 (2012). 
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III. THE ROLE OF COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DECISION-MAKING 
In prior sections, this Article focused on the role of marriage and 
family law, and whether court decisions on same-sex marriage have 
reinforced or reduced the importance of marriage as the gateway to family 
formation.  It is clear that the same arguments are being used to reinforce 
marriage, to accept same-sex marriage, or to broaden the scope of family 
protection through constitutional norms. A comparative analysis of national 
court decisions on same-sex marriage also shows that courts read each 
other’s work. 
There is abundant literature to accept as a fact that courts often use 
arguments articulated in other proceedings to develop their own legal 
reasoning.360  Even U.S. courts, though more cautious than courts from 
other countries in using foreign law, have referred in several decisions to 
foreign rulings.361  The means by which courts use foreign decisions varies 
greatly. Ann-Marie Slaughter refers to vertical and horizontal judicial 
globalization.362 When national courts use arguments and decisions by 
supranational courts, those courts are engaging in a vertical type of judicial 
borrowing, even when they are not bound by these judgments.  When 
courts look at what other countries are doing, they engage in a “cross-
fertilization” of judicial decisions.363  It seems that areas where there is 
insufficient precedent, or areas that can be perceived by society as radical 
shifts in a legal system, are good places to use foreign legal decisions as 
supporting resources.364  Technology has also made it easier for judges to 
contemplate foreign solutions to the same issues.  As Australian Justice 
Michael Kirby explains, “[h]onesty and transparency sometimes suggest an 
 
 360.  For an account on how judges use foreign law, see, e.g., David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, 
The Limits of Global Judicial Dialogue, 86 WASH. L. REV. 523 (2011). For an analysis on legal 
transplants in the context of adjudication processes in Canada, see, e.g., Michel Bastarache, How 
Internationalization of the Law Has Materialized in Canada, 59 U.N.B. L.J. 190 (2009). For Europe, 
see, e.g., Sir Basil Markesinis and Jörg Fedtke, The Judge As Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REV. 11 (2005). 
For Latin America, see, e.g., Horacio Spector, Constitutional Transplants and the Mutation Effect, 83 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129 (2008). 
 361.  For an analysis of the use of foreign legal decisions by American courts, see generally David 
S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie 
Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and 
the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005). 
 362.  Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1112 (2000) 
 363.  Id. 
 364.  See Sujit Choudhry, Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law, in 
THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 1, 4 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006) (“[F]oreign judgments are 
a source of practical wisdom to the tough business of deciding hard cases where the positive legal 
materials run out.”). 
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acknowledgement of such source materials.”365 
In the area of same-sex marriage, the use of foreign law is evident.  
The courts of South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, Portugal, Colombia, and Spain 
explicitly referred to foreign and international court judgments in their 
decisions, as well as foreign legislation and legal scholarship.  They used 
these sources in two different ways.  Sometimes, foreign sources were used 
to reinforce a particular argument advanced by the court.366  In other cases, 
foreign decisions were cited along with information on foreign legislation 
that includes same-sex marriage, and international law materials in favor of 
advancing gay and lesbian rights in general.367  With regards to how these 
arguments reach courts, in some cases decisions refer to arguments from 
foreign sources because the parties or third party interveners brought those 
sources to the court’s attention.368  Due to the different styles of writing 
decisions, however, it is not always possible to identify if foreign 
arguments are part of the parties’ litigation strategy, or if they were adopted 
by the court’s own initiative.  The use of international law varies depending 
on each country’s legal mandate to use international law.  All of the foreign 
decisions analyzed here refer to international instruments, especially those 
from Europe.  In some cases, however, courts used international decisions 
for their argumentative power, rather than as authoritative sources of law. 
A. Good arguments are good arguments everywhere 
Most literature on “judicial borrowing” analyzes the use of foreign 
 
 365.  Michael Kirby, Transnational Judicial Dialogue, Internationalisation of Law and Australian 
Judges, 9 MELB. J. INT’L L. 171, 173 (2008). 
 366.  See, e.g. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.) (quoting Brown 
v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to highlight the need for the legislature to seek a 
solution for same-sex couples that would include tangible and intangible benefits). In the case of 
Portugal, opponents to same-sex marriage argued that international law supported the position that 
marriage was protected as a union between a man and a woman. See S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82, 
DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367 (Port.) (citing several decisions, and quoting, 
among others, the South African decision in Fourie to highlight that international law may protect the 
heterosexual marriage but it does not forbid expanding such protection); Primera Sala de la Suprema 
Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo en Revisión 581/2012, Décima Época, 
5 de Diciembre de 2012, 41, 48–49 (Mex.) (citing Loving v. Virgina, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Brown, 347 
U.S. 483 (1954), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), to compare discrimination based on 
sexual orientation with racial discrimination). 
 367.  See Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de 
inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010,  slip op. ¶ 267 (Mex.); S.T.C., 
Acórdão No. 121/2010, ¶ 14 (Port.); S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012, (B.O.E. No. 286, p.168, 193–94) (Spain). 
 368.  Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 26, 2011, Sentencia C-577/11, 
Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. 30) (Colom.).  Additionally, all parties to the proceedings referred to foreign 
law to illustrate their own arguments. Id. at 17, 22–23; Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 99; SCJN, Acción de 
inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, ¶ 42. 
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legal sources by local courts from the perspective of their argumentative 
force.369  There is little disagreement about the lack of authoritative force of 
foreign sources.370  The substantive justifications given by others are what 
make a foreign case compelling or not.  It is the weight of the argument, 
not the weight of the court that made the argument that matters.  
Sometimes, a good argument made by a prestigious court makes a given 
argument even more compelling.  There is no way, however, to know what 
makes one court more prestigious than others to the court borrowing one of 
their arguments. Courts also refer to international decisions regardless of 
whether they are bound by them.  Non-binding international and foreign 
decisions are used by courts to find compelling arguments. 
The Colombia Constitutional Court explains the role of foreign 
decisions and foreign scholarship as additional argumentative sources, 
stating that “[f]oreign scholarship, before national scholarship, has dealt at 
length with this issue [of same-sex marriage].”371  The Court goes on to add 
that, “constitutional courts and tribunals of other latitudes have dealt with 
similar petitions, as the broad reference to comparative law by Action D-
8376 shows.”372  The Portuguese Constitutional Court gave a similar 
explanation for its use of comparative law.  The Court rejected the idea that 
the regulation of same-sex relationships was limited to a local discussion.  
On the contrary, it stated that when there are issues linked to “human 
problems as universal as those related to the legal protection of homosexual 
relations it may be interesting to know what happened in other legal 
experiences.”373  The Constitutional Tribunal of Portugal referred to the 
need to maintain its autonomy when deciding these issues, but stated that 
the use of comparative law could help it draw legal principles common to 
all of those legal experiences.374  With the exception of the American and 
Canadian decisions, the decisions on same-sex marriage presented here 
used both foreign and international decisions and scholarship to bolster 
their own ideas on the issue. 
The South African Constitution expressly allows judges to consider 
foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.375  In Fourie, the South 
African Constitutional Court cited Canadian case law to emphasize the idea 
that not all differentiations are discriminatory, and special measures are 
 
 369.  Choudhry, supra note 364, at 3. 
 370.  Id. 
 371.  Corte Constitucional, Sentencia C-577/11, ¶ 2.2. 
 372.  Id. 
 373.  S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, ¶ 7 (Port.). 
 374.  Id. 
 375.  S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39(1)(c). 
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sometimes necessary.376  For its justification on why same-sex marriage did 
not interfere with freedom of religion, the Court again cited Canadian 
sources as well as American decisions.377  The Constitution of South Africa 
also provides that courts “must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the 
legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative 
interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.”378  Consistent 
with the constitutional mandate, the Fourie decision included a section on 
international law.379 The Minister of Home Affairs argued that international 
law did not recognize a right to same-sex marriage.380  The Supreme Court 
of South Africa responded to the international case law against same-sex 
marriage by stating that “while it is true that international law expressly 
protects heterosexual marriage,” international law did not exclude the 
possibility of same-sex marriage.381 The South African Court showed 
deference to international law arguments brought to its consideration but 
rejected them on substantive grounds.382 
The Spanish Constitutional Court used comparative law in several 
parts of its 2012 decision on same-sex marriage.  For example, to support 
its statement that institutions evolve, the Spanish Constitutional Court cited 
the Canadian Supreme Court’s concept of the constitution as a “living 
tree,” and explained that the evolving nature of Spain’s Constitution is 
precisely the reason why the Court must reject marriage as essentially 
heterosexual.383  The Constitutional Tribunal of Portugal also referred at 
length to foreign courts.384 
As the South African case shows, many of the foreign decisions used 
 
 376.  Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 152 (citing Weatherall v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R 872, 874 (Can.)). 
 377.  Id. ¶ 9 (citing Canadian Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, Freedom of Religion and the Rule 
of Law: A Canadian Perspective, in RECOGNISING RELIGION IN A SECULAR SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN 
PLURALISM, RELIGION, AND PUBLIC POLICY 12 (Douglas Farrow ed., 2004); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301–02 (2000)). 
 378.  S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 233. 
 379.  Fourie, SA 524 ¶¶ 99–105. 
 380.  Id. ¶ 99. 
 381.  Id. ¶ 100 (citing Joslin v. New Zealand, U.N. H.R.C. Communication No. 902/1999, U.N. 
Doc A/57/40 (July 17, 2002)). 
 382.  In Fourie, the Counsel for the Minister of Justice argued that International Law protected 
marriage as a heterosexual institution. Id. ¶¶ 46, 100. The Court argued that the intention of 
international law was to “forbid child marriages, remove racial, religious or nationality impediments to 
marriage, ensure that marriage is freely entered into and guarantee equal rights before, during and after 
marriage.” Id. ¶ 100. The Court added that “[t]here is nothing in the international law instruments to 
suggest that the family which is the fundamental unit of society must be constituted according to any 
particular mode.” Id. ¶ 101. 
 383.  S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012, (B.O.E. No. 286, p. 180) (Spain). 
 384.  S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367 
¶ 12–15 (Port.). 
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by other courts for their argumentative force did not deal with same-sex 
marriage.  South Africa and Mexico, for example, used three American 
landmark cases to support same-sex marriage on the basis of equality, not 
marriage: Brown v. Board of Education, the dissenting opinion from Plessy 
v. Ferguson, and Loving v. Virginia.385  These courts could have decided to 
use compelling arguments on the importance of marriage.  If they were 
going to cite American jurisprudence, they had plenty to choose from 
opinions expounding on marriage as an essentially “good” institution.  
However, they decided to emphasize the discrimination inherent in a two-
tiered system of same-sex civil unions and opposite-sex marriage.386 
Brown, Plessy, and Loving are decisions that speak about equality not 
marriage, but their reasoning is appealing beyond any specific national 
constitution. 
The Brazilian STF’s 2011 decision also did not refer to specific 
arguments used by foreign courts.  No other decision, however, reads more 
like a text on jurisprudence than the combined opinions of the Brazilian 
decision.  Even though it is not possible to point to a specific “migration of 
constitutional ideas,”387 the decision referred to legal philosophy through 
the writings of American, European, and Latin American scholars.388  It 
used a universal narrative on the rule of law, the role of courts, and the 
concepts of equality and autonomy. 
By contrast, in its first decision on same-sex marriage, Mexico’s 
Supreme Court barely mentioned the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights.389  It did, however, cite the European Court of Human Rights 
 
 385.  See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka 347 U.S. 483, 
486 (1954), supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
 386.  Primera Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo 
en Revisión 581/2012, Décima Época, 5 de Diciembre de 2012, 41, 48 (Mex.); Fourie, SA 524 ¶ 150, 
154. 
 387.  Choudhry, supra note 364, at 2. 
 388.  For example, Luiz Fux cites foreign scholars such as Robert Alexy, Ernst Benda, and Nancy 
Fraser. He also cites Ronald Dworkin’s explanation of American constitutional law and considers the 
application of Dworkin’s writings to Brazilian constitutional law as well. Fux also cites Spanish 
scholars discussing the same-sex marriage legislation in Spain. See S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. 
Luiz Fux, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 659 
(Braz.). Justice Ayres Britto cites, among others, Max Scheler, John Rawls, Hans Kelsen, Nietzche, 
Hegel, and Sartre. See S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO 
SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 611 ¶ 9, 12, 14, 17 (Braz.). Justice Marco 
Aurelio refers to the opposing positions of H.L.A. Hart and Lord Patrick Devlin with regard to the 
decriminalization of sodomy laws. See S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Marco Aurelio, 05.05.2011, 
198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 808 ¶ 5 (Braz.). 
 389.  Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de 
inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010,  slip op. ¶ 313 (Mex.). 
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(ECHR) and its case law on sexual orientation discrimination.390  Unlike 
the ECHR, by the beginning of 2014, the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights had decided only one case that involved discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation, and it was not a case on marriage.391  In Atala Riffo 
and daughters v. Chile, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights made 
sexual orientation a protected category, and declared that the concept of 
family protected by the American Convention of Human Rights was not 
tied to marriage or to heterosexuality.392  The Atala decision had not yet 
been issued when Mexico’s Supreme Court issued its first decision on 
same-sex marriage.  The SCJN, however, used Atala to support its second 
decision on same-sex marriage, affirming that a separate but equal 
treatment of same-sex couples was unconstitutional.393 This second 
decision extensively cited foreign courts to support its arguments in favor 
of marriage equality.394  It also cited U.S. decisions to explain its levels of 
scrutiny.395  When describing the requirements for its own system of strict 
scrutiny, the SCJN reinforced its explanation by referring to the same 
concept used by the U.S. Supreme Court for each element of the test.396  
Brazil also referred to the Inter-American System of Human Rights, citing 
decisions that were not directly related to same-sex couples, but that spoke 
about the right to the protection of a person’s life project.397 
B. Foreign sources as descriptive tendencies 
Colombia used comparative law at length to illustrate the state of 
same-sex couples’ recognition around the world.398 The plaintiffs 
challenging the constitutionality of heterosexual marriage in the CCC 
included a thorough comparative law analysis to support their case.399  The 
court, however, “replied” to those comparative law arguments by giving a 
 
 390.  Id. ¶ 248. 
 391.  Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
 392.  Id. at 35, 50. 
 393.  Primera Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo 
en Revisión 581/2012, Décima Época, 5 de Diciembre de 2012, 50 (Mex.). 
 394.  See, e.g., id. at 25 fn. 9. 
 395.  Id. at 34–36. 
 396.  Id. 
 397.  S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Marco Aurelio, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR 
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 808 ¶ 14 (Braz.) (referring to the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights cases Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, and Gutierrez Soler v. 
Colombia). 
 398. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 26, 2011, Sentencia C-577/11, Gaceta 
Judicial [G.J.] (No. 30) (Colom.). 
 399.  Id. at 171. 
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full account of same-sex regulations around the world.400  Although the 
court focused on some arguments provided by foreign courts, it mostly 
focused on demonstrating that there was not one specific trend towards 
same-sex marriage as an equality imperative.401 
The Constitutional Courts of Portugal and Spain, as well as the 
Supreme Court of Mexico, also made references to comparative law.402  In 
all of these cases, references to both legislation and court decisions were 
used to support the Court’s own decisions.  The Courts did not employ, 
however, a particular foreign argument in their decisions.  Instead, they 
displayed the complete map of what was happening in other countries, in 
order to situate their own court within a worldwide trend.  They could 
demonstrate to their own community that they were not outliers, but rather 
part of an almost inevitable global shift.  The Constitutional Tribunal of 
Portugal referred to comparative and international law to support its 
statement that the realm of family and marriage was changing at a fast pace 
globally, and not just in Portugal.403 
As mentioned before, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Tribunal used foreign 
scholarship to support its own arguments.  It also used references to foreign 
regulations as a measure of an evolving reality in the area of same-sex 
couples.404  With this intent, the decision cited regulations of the European 
Union to support its own decision to recognize same-sex couples as 
permanent unions.405  The decision not only referred to binding European 
law instruments, but also to foreign sources related to discrimination.  
Justice Marco Aurelio’s opinion, for example, referenced the Wolfenden 
Report issued in Great Britain in 1957.406 
 
 400.  Id. at 171–74. 
 401.  Id. at 171. 
 402.  S.T.C., Nov. 6, 2012, (B.O.E., No. 286, p. 180, 193) (Spain); S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 
82, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367 ¶ 12–15 (Port.); Primera Sala de la 
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Amparo en Revisión 152/2013, 
Décima Época, 23 de Abril de 2014, slip op. 1, 26–27, 41, 48 (Mex.). 
 403.  S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, at 22370 (citing the European Human Rights Convention, 
supra note 250); id. at 22372–74 (referring to different European countries). 
 404. S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR 
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 611 ¶ 20 (Braz.) (citing the VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS (1776)). 
 405.  Id. at 16. 
 406.  S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Marco Aurelio, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR 
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 808 ¶ 4 (Braz.) (discussing the Wolfenden Report, a 
report issued by a Parliamentary Committee in the United Kingdom recommending a drastic withdrawal 
of government involvement in homosexuality and prostitution, recommending the decriminalization of 
sodomy and prostitution, and generating an influential debate on the relationship between law and 
morality); see generally PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959); H.L.A. HART, LAW, 
LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963). 
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The level of influence of foreign and international decisions in 
national courts’ decisions is indeterminate.  It is clear, however, that judges 
are reading each other’s opinions.  Perhaps those readings were compelling 
enough to convince them to consider their own constitutional frameworks 
as “living trees,” or to bring their own constitutional interpretations of 
dignity closer to autonomy and equality. 
IV. WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS 
A. Reinforcing the marriage paradigm: the conformist approach 
Same-sex marriage can be viewed as the most important departure of 
legal marriage from its basic source, the Judeo-Christian marriage.  This 
seems to reflect a new construction of the community ethos, based on the 
supremacy of individual autonomy rather than on restrictions of individual 
liberties for a supposedly collective benefit.  But as revolutionary as this 
claim may seem, we can also argue that this is the alternative that best suits 
the status quo.407 Same-sex marriage does not challenge marriage as an 
institution and it does not challenge state intervention in intimacy.  Same-
sex marriage leaves all elements and effects of the traditional institution 
intact.  It does not affect the claims of non-married heterosexual couples or 
the claims of individuals who have created their families around non-
traditional structures, such as sisters living together, or single friends who 
age together.408 The inclusion of same-sex couples into the marriage 
institution does not represent a real change of paradigm in family law.  It is, 
on the contrary, a sort of “escape valve” that maintains marriage’s status as 
the gatekeeper of the legal family. 
Countries that value marriage as a societal aspiration, and value 
autonomy and equality as core public values have two options. They can tip 
the scale towards marriage and maintain a caste-like system of families in 
which marital families receive more protection than non-marital ones.  Or, 
they can shift the focus from marriage to functions of dependency and 
support. In the latter, family and citizenship are liberated from their 
dependency on marriage.  In this scenario, family is tied to citizenship by 
assuming the role of forming individuals that understand values of equality, 
respect for diversity, and democracy. Instead, countries that decide to 
reinforce marriage as the family law paradigm are also reinforcing a 
traditional link between marriage and citizenship.  By doing so, they are 
 
 407.  ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 185 
(1995) (“Gay marriage is not a radical step; it is a profoundly humanizing, traditionalizing step.”). 
 408.  POLIKOFF, supra note 13. 
22_SAEZ_FORMAT 2 MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2015  3:18 PM 
192 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 25:125 
creating two types of citizens: the good citizen, and the “not so good” 
citizen. The good citizen gets married and by that act, simplifies the 
entrance to citizenship for her immediate family members.  The good 
citizen gets benefits and her family is legally recognized as such.  The “not 
so good” citizen, instead, does not behave in the way she should.  What she 
may call a family is not recognized as such.  Her citizenship is not good 
enough to provide citizenship to her immediate family members, and her 
contributions as a citizen are not good enough to take advantage of the 
rights and benefits granted to good citizens. 
In cases where marriage has been made available to same-sex couples 
based on the inherent value of marriage, the decisions show that same-sex 
couples are worthy of the institution of marriage.409  In order to achieve 
access, assimilation of the different group to the majoritarian group is 
necessary. Images of loving same-sex couples that are stable, caring, 
educated and engaged in their communities cover the pages of magazines, 
newspapers, court decisions, and congressional debates.410  Marriage is 
open to heterosexual couples no matter how badly they behave.  Same-sex 
couples, however, must show that the group is worthy of marriage as an 
aspiration. They are good citizens that need to become better ones by 
accessing marriage. 
The conformist approach to same-sex marriage closes the chapter on 
same-sex marriage.  It also closes, or at least makes more difficult, the 
debate on family protection and the role of family law.  After Goodridge, 
Windsor, and each new statute allowing same-sex marriage there is—
rightly so—a celebration by same-sex marriage advocates.  There is no 
celebration, however, for aunts, neighbors, and friends taking care of 
distant or unrelated children or dependent adults.  There is no celebration 
for heterosexual or same-sex unmarried couples who do not wish to or 
cannot marry for reasons unrelated to its recognition by a legal system, but 
who nonetheless act as and consider themselves a family. The division 
between married families and unmarried families continues. As long as 
family law acts as a filter through which only some unions become visible 
to the law, decisions that reinforce marriage as the most important bond 
will keep depriving individuals of possible legal protections for their family 
ties. 
Whether the United States maintains and reinforces the marriage 
paradigm will depend on the grounds that state courts may use to decide 
 
 409.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
 410.  Ariel Levy, The Perfect Wife, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.newyorker. 
com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-perfect-wife. 
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same-sex marriage cases after Windsor. There are already several courts 
that used Windsor as part of their reasoning to allow same-sex marriage.411  
Not all state courts have taken a conformist approach to marriage or have 
picked up on the institutional concept of dignity used by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court referred several times 
to Windsor in its 2014 decision on same-sex marriage.412 It used dignity as 
a justification for opening marriage to same-sex couples, but mainly used 
arguments based on equality.  The court referred to the substantive benefits 
granted to married couples that unmarried same-sex couples do not have.413 
This decision is a cause for optimism. 
B. Real families as legal families: the transformational power of the 
same-sex marriage debate 
By embracing a flexible approach to families, we recognize in all 
human beings the equality of worth enshrined in the South African 
Constitution.  We not only embrace the dignity that comes from choosing 
one’s family unit, but more importantly, we recognize that all family 
associations that respect constitutional values and human rights are worth 
the same respect.  Most people do not have the luxury of choosing their 
families, and with the exception of a small percentage of women, single 
mothers are not single mothers by choice.  Dignity, therefore, must cover 
not only autonomy, but also equality of worth. 
Triggered by the debate on same-sex marriage, the discussion on 
family diversity has the power to align the “real” families with the legally 
recognized ones.  Some decisions have given us an opportunity to start 
using the law to protect and foster the best possible environment for family 
stability, instead of clinging to the historical myopic obsession with 
marriage. 
The combination of several fundamental rights, such as autonomy and 
 
 411.  In the year after Windsor, around sixteen decisions on same-sex marriage were issued, all 
referring to Windsor. See, e.g., Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 339 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 2013); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 877 (N.M. 2013); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 
(D. Utah 2013); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Bishop v. United 
States, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014). Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 549 (W.D. 
Ky. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476 (E.D. Va. 2014); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 
2d 632, 648 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. Tenn. 2014); DeBoer v. 
Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014); Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036 (S.D. Ohio 
2014); Kendall Wright v. Arkansas, No. 60-CV-13-2662, 2014 WL 1998004 (Ark. Cir. May 15, 2014); 
Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (D. Idaho 2014); Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192 (D. Utah 
2014); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. 
Supp. 2d 1128, 1135 (D. Or. 2014). 
 412.  Griego, 316 P.3d at 876. 
 413.  Id. at 887–88. 
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equality, with a conception of human dignity, provides us with the grounds 
to make family law a set of rules aimed at protecting families as they 
evolve, rather than a set of rules that artificially construct a legal family to 
which families must conform.  It is impossible to maintain a political 
system that treats privacy, freedom of association, and equality as 
fundamental individual rights, but that simultaneously restricts marriage to 
heterosexual couples or, more importantly, restricts family protection to the 
married family. 
Discourses on dignity usually relate to different dimensions of 
humanity.  The South African Constitutional Court speaks of dignity as 
equality, though it has sometimes used dignity as autonomy or liberty.414  
The emphasis, however, is particularly set in equality of worth that derives 
from our condition as human beings.  Mexico’s Supreme Court embraces 
an idea of dignity linked to autonomy.415  It also refers to dignity as 
equality, but the emphasis in the case of marriage is on the right to freely 
choose family associations without a state-imposed ideal of the family.416 
These fundamental rights have been at the core of legislative acts and 
adjudication processes striking down sodomy statutes.  The next logical 
step, if courts are consistent in their interpretation, requires the rejection of 
majoritarian efforts to restrict marriage to heterosexual couples and the 
opening up of marriage to same-sex couples. Consistency, however, 
requires more than just allowing same-sex marriage.  It requires a revision 
of the reasons for protecting one institution over others.  This has been the 
approach of some of the courts reviewed here. 417  These courts have at 
least recognized that families today are formed from different sources.  
They have applied equality and autonomy to conclude that non-married 
couples should enjoy the same status as married couples when it comes to 
legal benefits and obligations. They have all recognized the evolving nature 
of the family and the need, for the sake of equality, to protect families 
 
 414.  See, e.g., Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524, 29 (CC) (S. Afr.); but see id. 
at 10. 
 415.  Rogelio López Sánchez, El Tardío Desarrollo de la Dignidad Humana y el Libre Desarrollo 
de la personalidad en el Estado Constitucional Mexicano, REVISTA DERECHO EN LIBERTAD NO. 3, 
146–47 (2009), available at http://fldm.edu.mx/revista. 
 416. Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia [SCJN] [Supreme Court], Acción de 
inconstitucionalidad 2/2010, Novena Época, 10 de Agosto de 2010,  slip op. 1, 98 (Mex.). 
 417. S.T.C., Acórdão No. 121/2010, 82, DIÁRIO DA REPÚBLICA, 2A SÉRIE [D.R.] 28.4.2010, 22367 
(Port.). In the Brazilian case, Justice Ayres Britto stated that the Brazilian Constitution protected “the 
family in its common or proverbial sense as a domestic unit, with little regard as if it was formally or 
informally created, or if its formed by heterosexual couples or individuals openly gay [homoaffetivas]. 
Consequently, the family is a cultural and spiritual fact at the same time (although not necessarily a 
biological fact).” S.T.F., No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Ayres Britto, 05.05.2011, 198, REVISTA DO SUPERIOR 
TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA [R.S.T.J.] 14.10.2011, 611 ¶ 28 (Braz.). 
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regardless of how they are formed. Which families get to be legally 
recognized does not depend on the nature of the bond, but on how those 
associations respect the same values and rights of each individual family 
member. Family units that do not respect equality between men and 
women, or children’s rights, do not have to be afforded the protection of 
the law. 
Decisions that have the potential to transform family law may one day 
desexualize families.  It is unrealistic to divide families according to the 
sexual orientation of their members.  What should matter is not the sex of 
the two individuals that make up a family unit, but the role each person 
fulfills within the family.  What Martha Fineman and Nancy Polikoff have 
argued for so many years now has practical equivalents in court decisions 
from countries with diverse cultural and legal backgrounds.418  There is 
more in common between South Africa or Canada and the United States 
than between Mexico and South Africa.  These countries, however, have 
chosen to see what reality has been showing us all along: families come in 
all forms and shapes.  As long as these familial associations respect the 
rights of their members, legal systems should not prefer one type of 
association to another. Some international courts are also taking a 
transformational approach by including diverse families within the scope of 
human rights.  In Atala, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
interpreted the right to family in Article 17 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights as encompassing different types of families: 
The Court confirms that the American Convention does not define a 
limited concept of family, nor does it only protect a “traditional” 
model of the family. In this regard, the Court reiterates that the 
concept of family life is not limited only to marriage and must 
encompass other de facto family ties in which the parties live 
together outside of marriage.419 
Through human rights and constitutional rights, countries in the 
Western world have created the framework to give all real families legal 
recognition.  Windsor gave the U.S. Supreme Court a new chance to define 
its stance on the role of marriage and its relationship to family protection.  
 
 418.  See generally, FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES, supra note 13; MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY 
MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2005); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational 
Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13 (1999); 
Martha Albertson Fineman, Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1031 
(2001); POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE 
LAW, supra note 13; Polikoff, For the Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex 
Marriage Both Miss the Mark, supra note 13. 
 419. Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, 47–48 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
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The Court in Windsor chose to speak about marriage rather than families.  
It chose to speak about institutional dignity instead of human dignity as 
equality and autonomy.  Fortunately, it did not completely abandon the idea 
of human dignity as liberty.  Future litigators and judges have the task of 
reinforcing that Kantian concept of dignity in U.S. courts, and following in 
the footsteps of South Africa, Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil by reclaiming 
the secular and liberal conception of dignity used in Lawrence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has shown that decisions from different countries 
allowing same-sex marriage are not all equal. While some courts focus on 
maintaining marriage as the paradigm of family formation, others center 
their analysis on individual rights. A comparative analysis of these 
decisions shows some promising trends for the future.  First, there are more 
decisions grounding their acceptance of same-sex marriage on equality and 
autonomy than on marriage as an essentially good institution.  Second, the 
use of dignity as a constitutional value is more often attached to the rights 
of equality and autonomy than to marriage as a status that provides dignity.  
Third, we see more decisions referring to the need for legal systems to 
adapt to social reality, which in turn will open a door to the legal 
recognition of unmarried families on equal grounds as married ones. 
Fourth, courts around the world are listening to each other, but not as a 
matter of authority or out of a sense of camaraderie.  Instead, courts refer to 
each other’s arguments as a way of ensuring that the most compelling 
arguments are being considered in their own decisions, and in order to 
show that their own communities are not alone when it comes to discussing 
new family associations.  These narratives allow for a transformation of the 
role of family law from a policing framework, which reinforces an 
aspirational family based on marriage, to a protective framework for 
socially constructed families. 
 
